# NEW TIMES

**The architecture of drinking**

**April 2 – 8, 1991**

13

A SOVIET
WEEKLY OF
ORLD AFFAIRS

K: £0.85
S: $1.40



# The egg they chained

PROPERTY OF THE
LIBRARY
JUN 07 1991
University of North Carolina
at Greensboro

ISSN 0206–1473

LEONID TISHKOV

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

# NEW TIMES

No. 13, 1991
Founded 1945

## NATION

POLITICAL LIFE *L. Gordon, M. Shakina* **THE GIANT WAKES UP** 4
DISCUSSION FORUM *A. Tsipko* **RUSSIA COMES TO LIFE** 6
*K. Myalo* **KREMLIN VS. MOSCOW** 8
REFLECTIONS *L. Bezymensky* **A DAY OF REMEMBRANCE** 11



The strike

p.4

## WORLD

USA – USSR *R. Nixon* **THE MOMENT OF TRUTH** 12
EAST – WEST *J. Kotkin* **A VIEW FROM THE PACIFIC** 15
BACKSTAGE STORY *I. Lagunina* **SAVED FROM AN IRAQI JAIL** 16
YUGOSLAVIA *P. Kandel* **A CONFEDERATION OR A COMMUNITY?** 18
GERMANY – USSR *N. Zholkver* **BUNDESWEHR MARCHES EAST** 20
NEW THINKING *S. Karaganov* **WILL THE SOVIET UNION OVERCOME ITSELF?** 22
MAIL TO NEW TIMES *Duong Thu Huong*
**CONFESSION OF A VIETNAMESE DISSIDENT** 25

Confrontation

p.18

## THIRD BASKET

MORALS AND POLITICS *I. Rudenko* **STATIONARY STARS OF CHARTER-77** 28
ESSAY *V. Volkov* **JUST HOT AIR?** 31
FEMALE LOGIC *T. Ivanova* **BIG BROTHER?** 32
LIFESTYLE *L. Elin* **THE WHITEST CONGRESSMAN** 33
THE WORLD PAPER IN NEW TIMES 36
MANUSCRIPTS DO NOT BURN *A. Andersch* **CHERRIES OF FREEDOM** 40
DESTINIES *L. Mlechin* **LICENCE TO KILL A WRITER** 43
ART *I. Pivovarova* **THE RUSSIAN SALON REVIVED** 46
CHESS *V. Fedorov, D. Plisetsky* **HE REMINDS ONE OF FISHER** 48
FROM OUR MAILBAG **(2),** PEOPLE **(44)**

Loaders or watchmen became ministers

p.28

*Cover by Victor Brel*

Our address: Pushkin Square, Moscow, GSP, 103782, USSR. Telephones: 229-88-72, 209-07-67

NEW TIMES

**Editor-in-Chief**
Alexander PUMPYANSKY

**Associate editors:**
Lev BEZYMENSKY
Alexei BUKALOV
Vitaly GANYUSHKIN
Sergei GOLYAKOV
Vitaly IGNATENKO
Leonid MLECHIN
Dmitry POGORZHELSKY
Lev YELIN
Galina SIDOROVA
Marina SHAKINA

**Business manager**
Alexander ARTEMYEV

**Designer** Igor SHEIN

**Editor-in-Chief of English edition**
Vasily KOROLEV

**Our own correspondents**

Algiers
Mikhail KHROBOSTOV
Belgrade
Gennady SYSOYEV
Berlin
Mikhail PODVIGIN
Bonn
Nikita ZHOLKVER
Bucharest
Sergei SVIRIN
Delhi
Sergei IRODOV
Havana
Vitaly SOBOLEV
London
Sergei BABUSENKO
Mexico
Yuri KUDIMOV
New York
Evgeny ANDRIANOV
Prague
Inna RUDENKO
Pretoria
Nikolai RESHETNYAK
Rome
Pavel NEGOITSA
Stockholm
Alexander POLYUKHOV
Tokyo
Vladimir OVSYANNIKOV
Vienna
Anatoly KOVRIGIN
Warsaw
Rudolf BORECKI

**Founders: *New Times* journalists**

Published in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish and Italian

● Printed by Moskovskaya Pravda Press. Telex: 411164a newt SU 411164b newt SU 411164c newt SU
Telefax: 200-42-23, 200-41-92
Advertising Department: 209-11-71, 209-92-82

© New Times

# From our mailbag

■ I fully agree with the author of the article "600 seconds of misinformation" (S. Soloveichik). I must say that in the past I was very keen on his television programme and felt respect for Alexander Nevzorov. But then came those strange attempts on his life and report from the Baltics. Maybe it is simply an outright insinuation and blatant chauvinism? It is not for nothing that Nevzorov is defended by Pamyat (Memory) and Otechestvo (Fatherland) societies. On Nevsky Prospekt one sees slogans reading: "Saddam Hussein – we are with you, we have a common enemy," and next to it: "Let us defend the true Russian patriot Nevzorov from Jewish Masons." Here you can also buy *Mein Kampf*, *The Protocols of Zionist Sages* and various pseudopatriotic profascist newspapers. On his programme, Nevzorov constantly attacks the Leningrad City Soviet. And what can the deputies do if they don't have power, for the Regional Party Committee wouldn't give up power? Not long ago there was a demonstration against the Leningrad City Soviet. Perestroika has shifted to the right, it has taken the road of the Polozkovs, Gidaspovs and Makashovs. It is the road to nowhere and I no longer expect anything good to happen.

**Sergei Smirnov**
Leningrad, USSR

■ I read in the section "People" (No.5/91) an article about the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member Ivan Antonovich who said: "It would be no mistake to say that for practically every citizen of our country Germany's unification was a personal tragedy." I am outraged that he reduces all of us to the same level. I ask the leaders of the Russian Communist Party: "Who gave a high-ranking party official the right to speak on my behalf?" I am a citizen of the USSR disabled in the war and a veteran of labour. And I don't consider this a drama. On the contrary, the brick wall with which they divided a single people was indeed a drama.

In the same interview Antonovich declared: "Almost all the republics realize that none of them can exist outside the Union." And what about such countries as Belgium, Denmark and Luxemburg? They live in isolation and each of them lives better than we do. And Yeltsin, whom Antonovich accuses of separatism, does speak on behalf of the Russian people: I am a Russian, I was born in Kostroma Region and I live in Moscow Region – and I don't agree at all with Antonovich.

**N. Lebedev**
Moscow Region, USSR

■ I am a regular subscriber to your magazine and I see how beginning in 1989 the style and the subject matters of the articles of some of your authors began to change. And how about your credo that you keep reminding us of – pluralism and freedom, impartiality and competence? Your pluralism is somewhat one-sided, your impartiality has a predilection for exposure – this is characteristic, for example, of articles by Simon Soloveichik and Tatiana Ivanova whom you have thanked officially for their writings. You should rather have made Tatiana Ivanova a present of foodstuffs – this is her main problem. Judging by her articles, she constantly stands in queues and her children don't have enough to eat. Inspired by the citation, these authors will begin with renewed energy to expose the "partocrats" and "nomenklatura," generals and colonels with their insidious plans for military coups, the intrigues of the central authorities

## In defence of Amnesty International

■ *New Times* issue No. 11 featured an article by Sergei Kovalev "The rules of the game I do not want to play." Sergei Kovalev, himself one of the founders of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International at the time when this could have meant persecution by the authorities, trials behind closed doors and long prison terms, now criticizes this organization. At the Geneva session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the representatives of Amnesty International did not say a word about the violation of human rights in the USSR, specifically, about the events in Vilnius. Kovalev thinks that the reason for this is that Amnesty International is about to open an office in Moscow and it needs the blessing of the authorities.

I know that A.I. devotes a lot of time and attention to the preparation of its statements and publications. Yet it did manage to publish with lightning speed a selection on the violations of human rights in occupied Kuwait (*NT* No.6/91)! Not long ago, a high-ranking KGB official made a caustic remark to me to the effect that my beloved A.I. no longer criticized the Soviet Union and did not organize campaigns of protest. "This is what we don't like about A.I. nowadays," joked my interlocutor.

Indeed, this is the case – but when this issue wa being printed, I was brought a bag of letters from th United States that were written by members of the U branch of Amnesty International. All of them rea roughly as follows:

"... I was appalled to learn about the killing of 14 u armed demonstrators in Vilnius. The entire world very much perturbed that Soviet soldiers could c such a thing and such an order could be given at time when relations between our countries and th USSR have begun to improve. Mr. Yelin, please c on the Soviet government in your articles to com mence right away a comprehensive and independe investigation of the circumstances of death of thes 14 people. The government should also see to it th law enforcement bodies know and observe intern tional standards regulating the use of force."

I hope that such mailbags have been received n only by the journalists writing about human rights, b also by the officials who violate them. And I, of cours respect the methods of A.I. It is good that on its ap peal, people from many countries begin to "bom bard" transgressors with letters. Although I think th a statement in Geneva would be also in place.

**Lev Yeli**
Editor, Department
humanitarian problem

**"I serve in the army and I am happy about it"**

**"Who is going to defend Nevzorov from the Masons?"**

**"Members of the Politburo should not speak on other people's behalf"**

and many other things that are now discussed by people in queues and on crowded buses. All this, though, is also sometimes discussed at congresses, sessions and in the mass media. Many people receive political capital from it. But I feel like asking a question: "Maybe that's enough exposing? Maybe it is time to get down to work, to creation?" Then one will begin to think about other things too, and not only about how to expose all and sundry. But even when one is exposing something or somebody, he should not speak on behalf of all his countrymen and all his peers. Ivanova thinks that she knows her countrymen very well. Yes, she knows them, but she knows what they are only when they stand in queues. But they also work in the fields, at factories, at dairy farms and serve in the army. And each of them is happy in his own way.

**G. Burya,**
**serviceman**
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky,
USSR

■ I am writing to you about the articles "Civilized order and public emotions" by Valery Chalidze and "Whither newly sovereign republics?" by Marina Shakina (No. 52/90).

Valery Chalidze called Lithuania's decision to restore statehood "courageous" and opening the way for a "process of freeing the Baltic republics from the control of the Union over their internal life." I must point out that this perestroika thesis is not at all in tune with the real assessment of the moves by nationalists who are creating their own state. Parasitizing on the former – we called it "socialist" – statehood, they keep on moving towards the recreation of a bourgeois-democratic state and are trying to achieve a complete independence from the USSR.

Marina Shakina has proclaimed a practical disintegration of the Soviet Union, citing declarations and statements. But these are only documents enunciating intentions and goals.

Have national television and national radio stopped their broadcasts to the entire country? Have we stopped using railroads, the national airlines, postal service, communication, bank system and money? Don't the government and the USSR Supreme Soviet exercise control over the country's borders, customs system, foreign economic ties and observance of intergovernmental contractual obligations?

**Anatoly Lavritov,**
**colonel of justice in the reserve,**
**Party secretary of the Communists of the Klaipeda commercial sea port**
Klaipeda, USSR

## THE WAY I SEE IT

*Drawing by Arkady Gursky*

■ The term "expenditure foreign policy" appeared not long ago, and we expected that the country would soon rid itself of that policy. In the past we saw many examples of an expenditure foreign policy. Let us recall the systematic support of all regimes that proclaimed themselves socialist. Let us recall the vast amounts of money spent on shoring up the leaders of Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, Syria and even the leader of Iraq who persecuted and executed Communists. But don't we continue even now to supply Cuba with oil and weapons? Cuba asks for weapons claiming that America may attack it. But life has shown that the United States is not going to attack it. The existence of the contemporary Cuban regime that is vividly demonstrating the helplessness of the given model of socialism even plays into Washington's political hands.

**A. Makedonov**

Leningrad, USSR

## The Poles were also killed in Kharkov

■ I am writing to you about the article "More about the Katyn tragedy." The authors are wrong when they assert that "The prisoners of the Ostashkov and Starobelsk camps must have been shot as well, but their graves have not yet been found." A significant part of the Polish officers from the Starobelsk camp have been taken to Kharkov and shot there. Here died all senior officers of the Polish army from colonels and up, as well as the high-ranking officials of the Polish government. The Kharkov officials of the KGB play an active role in the investigation into the criminal case instituted by the regional procurator's office in connection with the discovery of the site of the mass burial in Kharkov. The chief of the Kharkov Region KGB Office, Major General N. Gibadulov, told the seminar that there lay the victims of the Stalin repression. Besides Soviet people there are also Polish servicemen interned in 1939, taken to Kharkov in 1940 and shot there. After the study of the archives it will be possible to say for sure that those were the former inmates of the NKVD Starobelsk camp.

As early as at the beginning of 1989, they found people who at that time buried the corpses. They also found Polish insignia and remnants of a uniform. But the KGB and the procurator's office wouldn't admit that that was the location of a mass burial place. The point is that part of the territory is within the perimeter of the KGB recreation base (a constant Russian theme – feast on the bones!). And yet, in February 1990, the regional procurator's office opened the case and came to the aforementioned conclusions. And last September the case was forwarded to the Chief Military Procurator's Office, and suddenly all discussions about the need to exhume the corpses came to an end.

According to our information (which is not sufficiently verified), there are also other locations of mass burial places of Polish officers in Kharkov Region. And in Kharkov, besides the remains of Soviet citizens and Polish servicemen, there are also the remains of citizens of other countries. All these facts must be carefully checked.

**Evgeni Zakharov,**
**co-chairman of the Kharkov branch of the Memorial society,**
**deputy to the City Soviet**
Kharkov, USSR

# The giant wakes up

## Or why the Soviet power doesn't like its miners any longer

In the 1930s the whole country applauded miners-Stakhanovites. When miners remembered their rights 60 years later, Moscow asked them to return to the mines

**The miners are determined to stick it out to the last. The government is determined not to give up. How will the war of nerves end?**

In the past two years we have grown used to coal miners' strikes, and the news that miners were contemplating a new walk-out, that reached us about a month ago did not stir any special attention or curiosity, as it was a perfectly natural thing for the miners to go on strike now and then. Reports coming in from the major coal mining centres were discrepant but the general attitude was condescending and tranquil: soon the miners would get back to their senses, everybody hoped. Until the very last moment the government pretended not to "notice" the striking miners. But when the strike flared up instead of calming down, when 165 out of the country's 600 mines stopped work, when six miners and one people's deputy of the USSR went on a hunger strike at Moscow's Rossiya Hotel and people started donating money for the miners in Moscow and many other major cities, it was no longer possible for the government to pretend that nothing was really happening.

### 18 months. The experience of walkouts

The current strike is out of the ordinary. When in the summer of 1989 the miners first went on strike, the astonished society first discovered that the workers' move-

ment, which had traditionally been the ideological sacred cow, did exist in this country too, and not only in foreign lands. The leaders of the country had an unpleasant opportunity to realize that wholeheartedly supporting a strike of British miners was one thing, and having to face a massive miners' unrest at home was another. Everybody was staggered how soon the striking miners set up a network of strike committees and elected leaders whom they really trusted. In that summer, the miners' demands were largely economic. The emissaries of various political movements who flocked to the coal mines in an attempt to woo the miners, were firmly asked to leave. In the first few months after the strike, many miners realized, however, that economic problems cannot be solved if political ones remain unsettled. 500,000 miners took part in the 1989 strike.

A year later, on the first anniversary of the 1989 strike, the miners staged a purely political one-day strike. That strike was not viewed as much of a success, but remarkably, Yeltsin and Gorbachev reached an agreement as soon as a fortnight after the strike. The agreement was short-lived, but it might have been the strike that made the two leaders shake hands. After last summer the workers' movement was on the decline and signs of fatigue and disappointment were visible.

The January call for the miners to go on strike in protest against the crackdown on the Baltics did not get any response. The miners are finished, some thought sadly and others gladly.

A month later, though, a new wave of strikes hit the country.

## The wave swells

The strike spread like a peatfield fire–steadily but covertly. For the first time economic demands were combined with political ones. The miners have four political demands: resignation of Gorbachev, resignation of the Union government, dissolution of the congress of people's deputies of the USSR and the transfer of power to the Council of the Federation of the USSR.

Representatives of the strikers made it clear that the miners had to include political demands into the economic package: they saw that the dogmas-fettered leadership of the country were unable to solve the economic problems of workers. The strikers' political demands are fully constitutional, although some people insist they are not. The miners demand that the national leadership go, but their methods are non-violent and they stress their rejection of violence all the time. Their demands may not be an example of diplomatic politeness, but it is their language and their demands. Workers utter what society has long since realized and the authorities still continue to ignore – the very foundation of the system must be changed if the country is to get out of the crisis. Only a popular and trusted government can steer the nation through the time of troubles.

The surprising and so far unrealized feature of the current strike is that its radicalism is not the fruit of the activities of instigators from the overseas as the national news programme Vremya suggested, or of the mythical agitators from the Democratic Russia movement, or even of the leaders of the strike committees. The miners' radicalism came from the very midst of people. The attempts by strike leaders to talk the miners into accepting a compromise or more moderate forms of struggle like a one-day stoppage of work or gradual halting of production, failed flat. The sentiments of the miners are ahead of the strike committees' schemes.

The current strike is also remarkable for how quickly and effectively the strikers organized inter-regional cooperation, communication and coordination of efforts. On March 18-19 representatives of strike committees and independent trade unions of miners met in Moscow to set up a Coordinating Council of Strike Committees which began acting without delay.

Also, this is the first strike when the miners and the democratic public found each other. In 1989, the miners demonstrated loyalty to political leadership and even condemned democrats for their opposition to the Kremlin. In their turn, the leaders of the democratic movement obviously underestimated the miners and looked down at them. Today we see the emergence of cooperation between the strike committees and the Democratic Russia movement. Meetings in support of the strikers, round-the-clock pickets on Moscow's Manezh Square, the flow of food and clothes donations for the strikers testify that the call for cooperation has been heeded

## Court for the miners

It was only recently that the Union government started paying official attention to the miners. Before that the policy of the government vis-à-vis miners was, as far as one can judge from media reports, to covertly discredit the miners' cause and to set the whole population of the country, in particular railwaymen and metalworkers whom the strike harmed materially, against the miners.

What kind of damage do strikes inflict on the economy? Daily reports in Vremya suggest that strikes are the root cause of this country's troubles, or the main obstacle preventing the government from restoring order.

Strikes do damage economy, of course, but the harm they do is being very much exaggerated. Very often the loyal media do not stop short of plain misinformation: some reports have had it that in a number of cities there was no coal for central heating as a result of the strike, although the miners insisted they did not stop supplying coal for communal needs for a day. The strike committees are trying to minimize the damage done by the strike – in particular they organize what is called a wandering strike when only some mines in the region stop work, while others work waiting for their turn to go on strike. These attempts, however, are meaningless in the context when the government ignores the problems of the miners and pursues the policy of slow strangulation of the strikers under the motto: Come back to work, and then we'll talk. Is there any other way the government reacts to the strikes? It shuts down the mines and sues miners...

The recent Supreme Soviet decree outlawed all strikes for two months and instructed the Cabinet to look into the miners' economic demands and to punish those responsible for the failure to carry out last year's promises of the Ryzhkov government.

The same happened in 1989 when the government adopted a number of decrees on improvement of social conditions in the coalfields and the working conditions of the miners etc. Nothing of what was promised has been done. Does the government seriously believe that it can carry out its promises today after eighteen months of an economic crisis?

Strikes damage the economy, of course. But the damage done by strikes is in no way comparable to the damage resulting from the very nature of our economic system. One look at the State Committee for Statistics reports covering January-February 1991 when noone mentioned any strikes, is enough to help one understand that delivery failures, broken-off contracts and work stoppages across the country do a lot more damage to the economy than the strikes. This is not a chance coincidence, but an organic feature of the Soviet economic model.

Eventually the miners' strike may do a good service to the entire Soviet economy, by compelling the government to start

moving towards a free market economy. More favourable conditions for the development of the free market economy may be produced by the strike. After several years we may discover that the shutdown furnaces became an element of structural reshaping of our perverted economy under which more metal is produced to produce more equipment to produce more metal.

Many people believe that the miners' economic demands are exaggerated and unrealistic. They may be so, but this makes the miners' demand a subject for negotiations. If the government believes that only its opinion is the only right one, the government pushes the miners closer to a perpetual strike.

## The counterbalance

Fascinated by the political fencing match between Russia and the USSR, we have failed to observe the emergence of a formidable third force which will vastly influence the developments. The forms of civil confrontation between democrats and conservatives will also depend on which political forces will support the workers' movement.

The major levers of power, the Army, the KGB, the police force and finances are still controlled by the old Communist Party elite. The Democratic Russia movement can balance the situation by gaining popular trust and support from the organized workers' movement. The workers' movement can act as a deterrent and prevent the current confrontation from evolving into a civil war.

The miners believe that this strike will be a decisive one. If it fails, they say, the workers' movement in the USSR will be dead. Such declarations must not be understood literally, because the workers' movement will survive, no matter what may happen. On the other hand, much depends now on the fate of the strike, and support from other branches of the economy is what the strikers need most today.

The Supreme Soviet debates about the proposed two-month moratorium on strikes demonstrated that the central authorities have no idea of how to handle a real workers' movement. What will the moratorium produce? Strikes can be cracked down, miners can be forced into the shafts at gunpoint, but who can make them work?

The moratorium can aggravate tensions and cause a wave of indignation. If this happens, the miners' strikes may develop into an all-Union political strike. What will come of it? Hopefully, it will not lead to a Soviet version of the Tiananmen tragedy...

*Leonid Gordon,*
*Marina Shakina*



# The battle of Russia

**The extraordinary congress of people's deputies of the Russian Federation has developed into a furious fight between opponents and supporters of Boris Yeltsin and the confrontation between pro-Communist and pro-democracy forces ought not overshadow the main point of discord – the role and place of Russia in the new edition of the USSR. By presenting the opinions of two authors adhering to antagonistic viewpoints, we wish to encourage a discussion of this delicate issue.**

# Russia comes to life

## Only a renewed and authoritative central government can become the nucleus around which the tattered Soviet state will consolidate

*Alexander Tsipko*

What is the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic? The RSFSR is nothing but a theatrical prop. There were no historical or legal criteria for the formation of the RSFSR in its present boundaries. The RSFSR is not Muscovy, the land where Russians have lived since time immemorial. The RSFSR has much in common with the old Russian Empire and it retains Russia's territorial gains in the Northern Caucasus, the Volga Region and the Far East. And yet the RSFSR is not the Russian Empire. It is impossible to explain, for example, why the RSFSR should incorporate Dagestan where Russians have never lived and do without the south-western part of what was known as Novorosslya and is now part of the Ukraine, the city of Odessa and Bessarabia which were seized from the Turks by the Russian army at the beginning of the 19th century and where Russians have settled ever since. It is impossible to explain why today's Moldova, which lost national independence as early as in the 16th century, should be a subject of the new federation, as ideologues of the political movement *Democraticheskaya Rossiya* (Democratic Russia) insist, and in principle could acquire full-fledged state independence, and Tatarstan, which lost independence approximately at the same time cannot put forward similar claims.

### The price of the show

The boundaries of the RSFSR make sense only as administrative boundaries which facilitate administration of the territories. In principle, there has never been any need to set up the Council of Ministers of Russia or to elect the Supreme Soviet of Russia. The price of having a government and a parliament for Russia is actually the price for ideology, for an eye-catching theatrical prop. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR could, in principle, rule the traditional Russian lands as efficiently as the tsarist government did. This is only natural, because the traditional Russian lands have always been the pillar of central authority, the core and the natural historical foundation of the state. The state power itself loses all meaning if it loses control over the territories now called the RSFSR. One must note that the real political ruler of this country – the Communist Party – had to reject the very idea of having a republican Communist Party, a republican security service and a republican Academy of Sciences in Russia in order to be able to rule the whole country effectively.

Since the legitimacy of the RSFSR has always been artificial and based on ideology, the government of Russia could only exist if it observed two principal conditions: it had to obey all orders of the central leadership and to forget all claims to real historical legitimacy.

What is happening today? The theatrical prop strives to become a reality, a real political factor. The cripple of a state based on artificial, ideology-loaded legitimacy ("one of the equal Soviet republics) aspires to become a real independent state and to replace the Russian state now disguised as the USSR and possessing hidden historical legitimacy.

What results can be expected? First of all, a new Russian diarchy will appear, the ideological legitimacy will collide with the historical one, and the very meaning of central rule, its foundation will be heavily damaged. Actully, this will mean destruction of the millennium-old state. If the idea of sovereignty for the RSFSR is carried out completely, if the programme of formation of Russia's own army and monetary system is implemented, and if the President of Russia is elected, the country will return to the 1917 diarchy when the Provisional Government was opposed by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

### The domino effect

In fact, central rule is to blame for having made it possible for the government of the RSFSR to start speaking on behalf of historic Russia. The central power continues to obscure its real historical legitimacy and thus allows Boris Yeltsin to speak on behalf of Russia. The tragedy is that the very way to justify independence of the RSFSR, that is, the idea of self-determination of Soviet socialist republics can destroy the RSFSR from within. The current Constitution of the USSR based on Lenin's vision of the ethnic question makes the rights of the RSFSR equal to those of its constituents. If the RSFSR is just another republic, just another subject of the federation, then it is no different from Tataria, Bashkiria or Dagestan. As a result, the more Russia wants to distance itself from the centre, the more its constituent autonomies want to distance themselves from the Yeltsin government of Russia. The autonomies' desire is understandable and justified. The relations between Russia and the autonomies are based on the same principles as the relations between the Soviet Union and the RSFSR. Elections of the president of Russia will touch off a domino effect across the country. Following the downfall of the President of the USSR, other presidencies will start collapsing.

In a context in which the totalitarian structure is disintegrating, the significance of the will and the choice of political leaders grows dramatically, so does the number of alternatives for development. The Russian trump card would have been played in the struggle for new power and new state sooner or later, but it could have been used for a variety of different combinations and strategies. It could be played to generate a development modelled after the way East European democrats acted, i.e. to exploit the idea of the "salvation of the motherland" in order to overthrow the Communists and set up opposition bodies of power. But in our conditions the Russian trump card could also be played to destroy central rule as such and to set the Russian segment of the population against the non-Russian one. By the way, these rules of the game were first adopted by our Russophiles who began to oppose the centre as early as 1986 for their own reasons.

Instead of struggling for power on the Union level, the democrats moved to seize the niche granted them by the Constitution of the USSR and the ideological legitimacy of the RSFSR. Having raised the banner of anti-communism, the political movement *Demokraticheskaya Rossiya* nonetheless continues to pursue the Communist policy of destroying Russia and adhering to the logic of the October revolution – logic that commands that the Russian state be razed to the ground.

### Will the state be reassembled?

Some political scientists suggest the following model: after sovereignty is declared by all autonomous entities and administrative regions of Russia, the Russian state will be reassembled on a voluntary basis. This model is a utopia, another piece of ideological mythology. Its authors fail to see many factors. First and foremost, they ignore the fact that all the current political slogans are nothing but derivates from the current transitional situation in the state and society. All the ideas about a new community, new association that will replace today's unitarian state are deep-rooted in the still preserved integrity of the

**Yeltsin and Gamsakhurdia discussing in Kazbegi the situation in South Ossetia. The two republics try to do business directly, bypassing the Centre**

state. Naturally, in conditions in which the complete disintegration of the state is only wishful thinking, some republics have no choice but to choose the lesser of two evils and to agree to the new association advocated by Yeltsin and his idea for a Council of the Federation. When republics acquire real political independence, however, their attitude towards the idea may change drastically. As a result of republican isolationism, nationalists who oppose any form of integration with Russia may gain more influence. In general, if the USSR and the RSFSR disintegrate, the world will never be the same, a new geopolitical situation will emerge and the very question that today's Soviet republics may form a voluntary association will make no sence.

As a rule we never plan in advance. That is why we have to rely on common sense. Common sense suggests that we are facing a banal alternative: either a modern federal state with a powerful and efficient central government, a state which may emerge after all the separatist republics have been let go, or disintegration, demolition of this country, final alientation of all of its constituent parts.

Only a renewed and authoritative central government can become the nucleus around which the state will consolidate. Once again we face a dilemma: either Gorbachev's power becomes transformed into authoritarian power, or Yeltsin and the democrats openly declare themselves the central authorities, legitimate successors of the tsarist Empire, and not of the Soviet republic. Yeltsin and the democrats could put this as follows: we struggle for power and promise that once we come to power in Russia we will start sorting things out with other peoples of this country, but we will do that as successors of the Russian Empire, not of the RSFSR created by Vladimir Lenin.

## What common people will most benefit from?

For some reason everybody hurried with the political burial of Gorbachev. The new politicians want to bury Gorbachev as soon as possible, for his ouster from the political scence could offer at least some prospects for themselves. In my opinion, though, common people would benef more if Gorbachev the reformer woke u and embarked on a policy of gradual re forms, than they would if a new reforme came to power through political catac lysms and massive bloodshed.

Russia and the Centre needn't neces sarily reach a compromise. The free pres freedom of speech, association and mee ings allow the opposition to try to come t power in a universal democratic electio but not through the destruction of th Centre.

Naturally, the Russians can cemer eight or nine traditionally Russian regior into a new state – the Republic of Russi but this prospect is only a dream of som local politicians and Russophiles focuse on national rebirth of Russia. As for th leaders of *Demokraticheskaya Rossiy* they dream of a new community, a com monwealth of sovereign states; they refus to see their political future without som form of a community of peoples living t this country. If the country is ruled by th Council of the Federation, the Council o the Federation itself will be headed by th leader of the largest republic – Russia.

A political game is going on. Som politicians are cashing in on the inertia o imperial thinking – for example th newly-founded Communist Party of Rus sia which is actively exploiting nationali sentiments and xenophobia, others pla on the people's sence of justice (loo other republics have what we do not We are witnessing various politic forces manipulate with different aspects weaknesses and ailments of the nation awareness.

# Kremlin vs. Moscow

## The Kremlin's victory over Russia will mean mutual annihiliation.

*Ksenia Myalo*

On March 12, 1991, a group of lawyers sharply brought up the problem of Russia's own presidency. In an article published by the conservative daily *Sovietskaya Rossiya* they passed their harsh and final verdict: "...turning to the experience of foreign federative states, one has to admit that in none of them the system of bodies of power of members of the federation includes the institution of presidency... Th gives us ground to declare with all respon sibility that Russia does not need its ow president..."

## The year of the presidents

Dura lex sed lex, one would have bee tempted to sigh, had it not been for on curious observation: our lawyers wh sound like Roman law-givers when the present juridical arguments against Rus sia's presidency were remarkably flexibl

and tolerant throughout 1990, which can by right be described as "the year of the presidents". Following Gorbachev who had himself elected the first president of the USSR, leaders of seven Union republics – ranging from tiny Moldova to mammoth Kazakhstan – declared themselves presidents without meeting any condemnation from the juridical community. How can one more presidency – that of Russia – upset this well-tuned chorus of other presidents elected in various Union republics? What is that principled difference that makes the juridical community break its pacified silence and voice active indignation? Is it the fact that in contrast to the other cases, the introduction of presidency in Russia was put on a referendum and a future president of the Soviet Union's largest republic would be elected on an alternative basis and by universal suffrage?

There is no need to ask rhetorical questions. The reason is obvious: it is Russia's desire to obtain a legal status that could make her equal with other constituent republics of the USSR. The formula describing the USSR as a union of sovereign states offers Russia an indisputable right to seek equality among other republics, the right Russia has suffered to earn over decades of ambiguous identification with the Soviet Union in general. Russia has paid a dear price for that: her own needs were dissolved in those of the Soviet Union and the results of this process are crying today. Besides, being not even a republic, but something like a federal territory of the USSR, Russia was perceived by other members of the Union as "the empire": an image which had nothing in common with the real condition of Russia's citizens, but which never stopped to form a very special inter-ethnic psychology.

Today, for the first time after 1917, Russia is taking baby steps for restoration of her statehood and this process makes the problem of relationships between Russia and the Union a central one in the domestic political scene. Everybody can feel the Russia-USSR confrontation, although most people reduce this complicated situation to the personal rivalry between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Unfortunately, the Yeltsin-Gorbachev confrontation is only a sheath covering the nucleus of the conflict. That is why the personalities of the rivalring leaders attract too much attention and in this article I shall refrain of giving any personal assessments of either Gorbachev or Yeltsin in order not to obscure the essence of the conflict.

The essence of the problem is as follows: the former "federal territory" occupying the largest part of the Soviet Union and incorporating a tremendous economic and demographic potential is going sovereign. This gives rise to the question: What is the Soviet Union without Russia? What will remain of the USSR if Russia takes an upper hand in the unprecedented conflict between the Kremlin and the leadership of the Russian Republic?

## A giant crawling on all fours.

The emerging Atlantis is about to shatter the entire pyramid of power, it restricts the territory subordinated to the Union leadership and tests the strength of "the union of sovereign states".

Evidently, although a part of the USSR, Russia remains what God created it to be: a great nation, albeit disfigured under Soviet power, with a territory and potential much larger than those of all other republics. It appears that Russia's relations with the other republics should develop like international, treaty-regulated relations. It is obvious for anyone, for instance, that the United States and Iceland, or Portugal, are different in size, economic potential and political weight. This, however, is in no way humiliating for either Iceland or Portugal, but is objectively reflected in these small countries' juridically equal relations with the superpowers.

This prospect and the possible new role of Russia which will stop crawling on all fours in order not to insult smaller partners, destroys the ideological stereotype which essencially prevents Russia from regaining her former place in history. Moreover, if Russia does regain its former place, this would drastically limit the central government's role or even would render this role meaningless. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan was quite outspoken when he said that Russia's gaining of a political role worthy of her actual significance in the Union would mean the virtual restoration of the "Russian empire."

According to this logic, one easily concludes that by raping history which had created Russia as what it is, the Russian Republic, one republic in the Union of sovereign states, must be put on a short leash and discriminated by means of her juridically incomplete status for the sake of an ideological Chimera. We have been over that already and Russia is not likely to agree to accept this fate once again, especially today when the ideology, which used



*Drawing by Victor Bogorad*

to give at least some meaning to the meaningless situations, is dying.

Another model is being tested now as Russia approaches full sovereignty: the Roman rule **divide et impera** is being applied to Russia itself, Russia's autonomous entities are also actively going sovereign and have already been offered the status of independent subjects of the Union Treaty. If this scheme works, the result will inevitably be a conflict between the autonomous entites of Russia and the leadership of Russia while the Kremlin will have a chance to pass its headaches onto Russia.

In this case the future "renewed Union" will have an unprecedented structure: the sovereign state USSR, incorporating the sovereign state Russia which, in turn, incorporates sovereign states inside a larger such union.

## The second drowning of the Atlantis?

However, the autonomous entities' joining the Union Treaty prior to the conclusion of the Federal Treaty of Russia and the corresponding settlement between Russia and the USSR will violate the constitutions of the USSR and the Russian Republic and territorial integrity of Russia. In other words, Russia will be disintegrated and the Union leadership seem to regard this disintegration as the most radical way to resolve the USSR-Russia differences. This scheme is all the more transparent as only the autonomous entities of Russia were permitted to participate in the Union Treaty, despite similar requests from the non-Russian autonomies of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Similarly, only the autonomous entities of the Russian Republic were allowed to participate in the drafting of the new Union Treaty. It remains unknown what our learned lawyers think about such constitutional acrobatics.

The process develops according to its own inetorable logic and this logic suggests that the next step will be declarations of sovereignty from Russia's administrative regions and territories or their associations. Can anyone deny this right to administrative regions and territories, which are often ethnically as diverse as most autonomous entities.

This right cannot be denied today when individual regions have become de facto sovereign after they elected not to participate in the referendum of the Russian Republic which in a number of cases, particularly in Tataria and Chechen-Ingushetiya, resulted in more tension. This de facto sovereignty now needs only to be formalized de jure, and as a result the new subjects of the Russian Federation will get the right to participate in the Union Treaty. If this happens, the number of the participants in the Union Treaty will grow significantly, but Russia, which will lose sovereignty as a single state whole, will be left out in the cold.

This second drowning of the Atlantis will touch off an unprecedented constitutional crisis, because even the super flexible Soviet laws will be openly violated. Besides, what about the parliament of the already non-existent "sovereign state"? The only way out will be to dissolve the parliament. Besides, the example of Russia may inspire administrative regions in other republics – the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, for instance – to claim their sovereign rights, which will set in motion the entire political map of the USSR. In this case, little will be left of the "Union of sovereign states."

## What will happen to "the backbone"?

For the sake of justice one must note that the current situation had been largely engineered by the Russian leadership itself when the draft Constitution of the Russian Republic sponsored by that leadership made the status of administrative entities inferior to that of national-territorial entities. By offering administrative entities the status of federal territories, the draft Constitution reproduced the very contradiction which is currently breaking the relations between the Union and Russia and is itself a consequence of Russia's ideologically-deformed status within the USSR.

If in the past the whole of Russia existed as a federal territory within the USSR, this time attempts are made to confer the status of federal territories to the predominantly Russian, although ethnically diverse, regions and territories within the Russian Republic itself.

In my opinion, the idea of a Republic of Russia suggested by Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Maley in his programme *Osoby Put Rossii* (Russia's Special Way), is no good solution either. The Republic of Russia strentching from west to east and a home of 80 percent of the federation's current population, such a republic will soon find itself in a situation as ambiguous, as the one in which Russia is now. However, the Maley programme at least brings up the long-ignored problem of statehood for the Russians.

The situation could have been improved, had the status of Russia defined her as an integral multinational state, but this question, on which the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic contemplated a referendum, was withdrawn from the agenda under pressure from the faction *Kommunisty Rossii* and representatives of autonomous entities.

Meanwhile, this option offered opportunities to set up a federation of equal federal entities modelled after pre-revolutionary Russian guberniyas (with elected administration), or states likes those in the USA or Germany. Each of such federal entities could help implement national interests of major population groups in the framework of national-cultural autonomy and broad municipal self-government.

## Emerging from the political void

Rejection of this variant of solution to the Russian riddle will undoubtedly push the process closer to more complicated and controversial solutions. This, in turn, will exacerbate the relations between Russia and the Union, which the Kremlin still tries to put back into the delapidated ideological framework. It is no coincidence that President of the USSR so often recalls Russia's tremendous responsibility and her role as the backbone of the USSR but has not uttered a word about Russia's formidable problems.

If Russia fails to uphold its rights, her future will be a replica of its past. An exhausted nation blamed for all the blunders and miscalculations of the Union leadership, vociferously hated by "the younger brothers" for its clumsily paternalistic attitudes – this is a realistic prospect for Russia.

However, Russia is nearly exhausted and if it gets the old role imposed on it once again, the backbone may crack under pressure. The backbone will break too if "the integral and indivisible" Russia is replaced with miscellaneous principalities and khanates. Is it wise to break the backbone? Anyway, the time when the Union could exist at the expense of Russia's political non-existence is over and today the Union's swallowing up of Russia will only mean their mutual annihilation.

# A day of remembrance

*Lev Bezymensky*

It is not very often that meetings of state leaders bring about surprises, especially pleasant ones. It so happens that they have to be occupied with day-to-day matters and pressing problems. Hence I was particularly happy to learn from the report about the recent meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Hans-Dietrich Genscher that they had discussed a topic that had nothing to do with the current affairs: the forthcoming 50th anniversary of Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. It is very good that politicians do not always let political "routine business" overwhelm them and stop to think about some more important things, about their own and other people's pasts, about great and even terrible things.

We have to follow their example and do the same. One cannot even call the 50th anniversary of that terrible day of June 22,1941, an "occasion" for reflection. The word "occasion" is inappropriate in this case, for that day should always be with us as a day for all our people to remember. It is precisely for that reason that I venture to share my thoughts with readers.

Have we ever given a thought to the fact that in our life, in our collective existence (and we have got used to a collective both in its good deeds and its bad ones), in our Soviet calendar we have time to rejoice, but no time to grieve? As for me, I recall with a kind of childish love the mournful day of January 21 when the young Soviet country honoured the memory of Lenin. Then the day of mourning was abolished and appeared the day of magnificent grand meetings and long speeches – the day of April 22. So, this is how we continue to live in the calendar of necessary and unnecessary holidays. For example, why do we have to celebrate Constitution Day, celebrating a Constitution which we change at almost every session of parliament? Today even the wisdom of celebrating the 8th of March is being called into question by women themselves, who would prefer the everyday care about them to one day of glorification.

Each people, each country has a right to have its own calendar. And let me point it out that almost each country has in it not only days of rejoicing, but also the days of grief – religious and secular days of remembrance, the days of honouring the deceased relatives and friends.

For this reason I want to propose to declare June 22 a **National Day of Remembrance** or simply: **Day of Remembrance.** Perhaps someone will come up with a better name, but I think that the idea is clear.

This must be the day of remembrance of those who died in that great war for the freedom and independence of this country. This must be the day of gratitude both to the dead and the living – to all those who at the front and in the rear, in partisan detachments, in the European Resistance movement and in the Nazi torture-chambers went through great torment.

This must be the day of condemnation of fascism and everything – as it was ably formulated by Gorbachev and Genscher – that deserves to be condemned.

This must be the day of damnation of those who, playing with the lives of the millions, plunged the world into the abyss of wars, as well as of all those who are sowing the seeds of hatred among races and peoples, who continue to draw on the spiritual legacy of Nazism, anti-Semitism and all other paraphernalia of aggression.

This must be the day of remembrance of all the sacrifices made over the long years by the peoples of our country in all the camps from Magadan to Majdanek.

In other words, I would like all people to put their heads together and think about the meaning and the nature of the approaching anniversary.

First, they should think about what we **don't need** on June 22.

We don't need long grand meetings with speeches and performances of artists.

We don't need military parades.

There is no need in issuing again to all living war veterans another medal or another order. We already have them.

We don't need to be issued special rations for which we have to stand in line for 2-3 hours and then get a casual look from shop assistants.

We don't need new rules that give certain privileges to war veterans as compared with the rest of the citizens, which provokes grumbling in queues.

Instead I would propose to all Soviets – in cities, districts and villages – to ascertain right away who among the war veterans really needs assistance, allowances and better housing. Let them be given the help they need.

I would use the time that we still have left before June 22 for burying the sorrowful remains of the soldiers who have not yet been committed to the earth that gave birth to them.

I would take special care of those who have suffered twice: in the Nazi camps and then in the Stalin's "screening" camps. All those who have been in captivity must no longer bear the stigma.

The Day of Remembrance must be observed at graves and monuments (it would be a good idea to put them to rights). This must be the day of common silence, and for the first time I would observe it in common. On June 22, 1991, all residents of Moscow and other cities and villages could take to the streets and keep silent together, maybe even going down on their knees and asking the dead for forgiveness.

But let us come back to the conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. They are right that this day should become not a day of vengeance and discord between our peoples, but a day of joint responsibility for the future and a symbol of a fundamental change in our relations. This will require joint efforts and joint reflection on the part of the representatives of both peoples. As the first reaction, I begin to think about the need of sending "caravans of memory" – Soviet people would go to Germany to visit the graves of their grandfathers and fathers and the Germans would come to visit the few graves that are still preserved in this country.

And here is a completely unrealizable proposal: how about our president inviting the leaders of all countries that fought the war both on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition and against it to come to Brest – the first victim of the attack – on June 22, 1991? He would invite them not for negotiations or, for that matter, for signing a declaration. He would invite them with only one purpose in mind: to reflect in silence on peace and war, and on the lives of each of us.

And this would take place on that Day, Day of Remembrance.

*USA – USSR*

# The moment of truth

*Richard Nixon*

Profound changes have occured since my first trip to the Soviet Union in 1959, when Nikita Khrushchev and I met in what later became known as the Kitchen Debate at the American Exhibition in Moscow. The most significant change is that this will be the first time in several visits that I will meet not only with government leaders but with leaders who are not in government, with leaders in newly proud and assertive republics, and even ordinary people without having to assume that chance encounters with them are a courtesy of the secret police.

**If the Soviet Union turns back to the dark days of reaction it will find itself on the sidelines of history**

## Following the Kitchen Debate

Since 1959, both the United States and Soviet Union have gone through the ordeal of unpopular foreign wars in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. We were on different sides in those conflicts. But it is vitally important to note that in the two centuries of our relationship there has never been an occasion when American soldiers and Soviet soldiers fought each other in war.

We have had profound differences in part because as the only two nuclear superpowers we inevitably became geopolitical competitors and at times adversaries on the world scene. Efforts to reduce those differences have been made by both sides. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson participated in meetings at the highest level with Soviet leaders. After each of these summit meetings, some naive observers predicted that we were entering a new era of good relations between our two countries. Some of you are old enough to remember the Spirit of Geneva in 1955 the Spirit of Camp David in 1960, the Spirit of Vie nna in 1961, and the Spirit of Glassboro in 1967 We learned, however, that good personal relation between government leaders do not automaticall produce good state relations. Spirit without sub stance evaporates very quickly.

In 1972, I became the first American President t visit Moscow. Since then, Presidents Ford, Carte Reagan, and Bush have had productive summ meetings with Soviet leaders. Progress was mad on difficult issues like arms control. But we con tinued to be adversaries in many areas – military economic, and ideological. But just as importan as finding agreement on some issues was our suc cess at developing a process for disagreeing o other issues without resorting to armed conflict.

Then came 1989 – the year of the century fo those who cherished peace and freedom in th

**Moscow, 1959. Nikita Khrushchev: "...in five years we will pass you, and I will be wavin goodbuy."** *Photo from Pravd*

Former US President Richard Nixon granted NT permission to publish the text of his speech given before the Soviet public

world. The Berlin Wall, the ugly symbol of the conflict between East and West, was torn down. As a result, most foreign policy observers, both East and West, said that this marked the end of the Cold War. Since then, we have seen dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, in the Third World, and in the Soviet Union.

In the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, we have learned that democracy and free markets do not instantly produce economic progress.

In the Persian Gulf, where our interests have traditionally clashed for over 40 years, we joined in condemning Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. But because we acted together in opposing the aggressors in Iraq does not mean, as some observers suggest, that in the future we shall be partners and allies rather than adversaries in all conflicts that may develop in the world. Iraq was a special case. Most of the nations that joined the allied coalition did so not because they liked each other but because they hated or feared Saddam Hussein. This may not happen again in a future conflict.

But assuming that the Cold War is over, we all hope that we will now be able to create a new world order that will finally operate according to the great principles of peace that brought the League of Nations into being after World War I and the United Nations after World War II. But again, we must leaven our hopes with reality. Since the end of World War II, 140 wars have been fought in the world. Eighteen million people have been killed in those wars, more than were killed in all of World I. Most of those wars would have been fought even if there had been no Cold War. Even today, there are 20 wars being waged in the world in which thousands of people are killed every year.

We cannot shrug off our responsibilities by pointing out that because of the role the United Nations played in the Gulf War, we can now rely on the UN to produce and preserve peace whenever wars erupt, as they inevitably will. The UN at times can play a very constructive role. But one fact stands out above all others. For a really meaningful new world order to exist – not just peace, but peace with freedom and justice – cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States is indispensable. The challenge for the leaders of both of our countries is to meet that awesome responsibility.

## Freedom is not a magic wand

Like all successful politicians, President Mikhail Gorbachev is not one-dimensional. He is a troika – a sincere, true-believing communist, a patriotic Russian nationalist, and most significant of all, a brilliant, pragmatic politician. In the six years he has been in power, he has changed the world. Even more important, he has changed the Soviet Union.

But when we look at the all-important issue of the economy, let me be undiplomatically blunt. Soviet economic policies have been a dismal failure. President Gorbachev has boldly advocated reform, but his government's policies have failed to recognize two fundamental truths. There is no halfway house between a command economy and a free economy, and there can be no successful private enterprise without private ownership. The inadequacy of President Gorbachev's reforms have led some critics in the United States to charge that he cannot cut the umbilical cord which joins him to the Marxist-Leninist communist philosophy that has nurtured him throughout his life.

I vividly recall Nikita Khrushchev telling me 32 years ago before a worldwide television audience, "We are behind you now economically, but in five years we will pass you, and I will be waving goodbye; follow us if you want to be able to compete with us." President Gorbachev has called Khruschev's overly optimistic comments wild and totally unrealistic. He was right. The past 30 years have proved without question that when a free economy competes with a command economy, it is simply no contest.

Yet freedom is not a magic wand that creates prosperity with one flick of the wrist. There is no better proof than in the nations of eastern Europe, where reality has fallen so dramatically short of expectations. In China ten years ago, I commented that communism gives all people an equal share in poverty, while freedom gives all people the opportunity to work their way out of poverty. What many people may not realize is that an opportunity is not the same as a guarantee. They may ask, "What about free housing, free education, free health care, all of which are guaranteed by communist command economies?" The answer is that nothing is free. Only free people can produce the wealth to provide things some people cannot provide for themselves.

Americans wholeheartedly endorsed the beginning of President Gorbachev's historic reforms. But it is already a cliche to say that perestroika has run into serious roadblocks. Some of its architects have been sidelined or have left the government altogether. And now even the "new thinking" in foreign policy is under attack. Momentum is being squandered in a climate of mutual recriminations, intolerance, and outright personal hostility.

We know that the Soviet people are discouraged, and we can easily understand why. If it is hard to live by bread alone, it is harder still to live with shortages of bread. Lines for food and other necessities are getting longer, crime is becoming more prevalent, and long-suppressed ethnic tensions are exploding across the Soviet Union. The temptation is strong to give up or even to give in to nostalgia about the way things were before perestroika, when at least basic goods were available, some rules, even if arbitrary and counterproductive, were observed, and there was some predictability and stability.

But trying to go back to the so-called "good old days" would be tragic and futile. Attempts to turn back the historical clock always fail. There is nothing more destabilizing than trying to arrest a revolution in mid-course. And yours, whether those who started it intended it or not, is by now a true revolution, one that has broken irrevocably with old Marxist-Leninist ideology, with old habits of being submissive to dictatorial government authority, and with relying on the State to take care of your material needs and even your souls.

I am confident that in this perilous movement you will triumph over your misgivings and discouragement. Great peoples show what they are made of not when the going is easy, but during times of crisis, when the going is tough. This is your greatest crisis, your movement of truth. The decisions you make today will ultimately determine the place you will hold in history and the future you will build for your children. It will also determine the course of U.S.–Soviet relations. The American people have made an emotional stake in the success of your reforms. It would be painful to them, and harmful to the spirit of cooperation we both want so strongly, if their high hopes for meaningful reform in the Soviet Union prove to be shortlived.

## The problem of the Baltics

Let me turn now to another sensitive subject, the future of the relationship between the central government of the Soviet Union and the republics. The general rule is that this is an internal problem, that it is your business, not ours. But when internal problems affect foreign policy, then it is everyone's business. The Baltics are a case in point. The Baltics did not join the Soviet Union voluntarily. They were incorporated into the Soviet Union by the infamous Hitler–Stalin pact, which has been condemned by the Soviet Parliament and by President Gorbachev. The United

States has never recognized the legality of Soviet domination over these nations. This issue poisons our relationship. It would serve the interests of the Soviet Union at home and abroad to move expeditiously to respect the wishes of the people of the Baltics, which were overwhelmingly clear when they voted for independence.

There is little doubt that the stormy process of change unleashed by reform threatens the very fabric of your nation. It is easy to understand the temptation to restore stability at almost any cost. But can the legitimate need to restore stability justify brutal repression? Can coercion and violence keep reluctant populations together? Can you, in the great departure from a centrally planned economy, encourage free market forces one day and the next day harass new entrepreneurs, essentially punishing anyone who take literally your own new emphasis on individual economic initiative? Will any of these measures allow your great country to integrate itself into the international community and the international economic system? The answer to all these questions is an unequivocal no. The trouble with your reactionaries is that they have a number of legitimate complaints but no adequate solutions to either repairing your structural economic problems or keeping the republics from leaving the union.

Moscow, 1991. Richard Nixon with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

*TASS photo*

## Left behind again

I do not suggest that America has all the answers. Yours is a country with a long and great history and a unique tradition. You have to sort things out for yourselves. That does not mean measuring success by blindly adopting foreign models, including those of the United States. Your tradition emphasizes spirit, great art, inner growth. Perhaps these things seem less important to millions of Soviet citizens currently deprived of basic necessities, yet they are great accomplishments, not just for your country but for civilization as a whole. By Marxist–Leninist materialistic criteria, the whole history of Russia prior to 1918, in comparison with the much more prosperous West, was one great failure. But I am convinced that while you paid an enormous price for your preoccupation with spiritual values, you enriched all mankind.

The United States and the Soviet Union are different, and our solutions may not be applicable to your situation. But there are certain truths that have been borne out over and over again throughout history. In the long run, freedom works, releasing people's creative energy works, allowing people to exercise their right of self-determination works. These ideas may sound almost like cliches. But unless your country is prepared to embrace them, there is a danger.

The accomplishments since my last visit in 1986 have been extraordinary – glasnost, allowing free elections, allowing the eastern Europeans to determine their own destiny, accepting the unification of Germany, and beginning to disengage from the collection of international outlaws Moscow used to support in the Third World. But if after all this you turn back to the dark days of reaction and do not stay the course of enlightened reform, you may find yourselves on the sidelines of history, isolated from the mainstream of international developments. Your spectacular reforms at home and all of your statesmanlike initiatives abroad will be neither appreciated nor rewarded. You will then find yourselves in an even weaker position than when you originally started. I cannot believe your talented, creative people would settle for such a fate. The Soviet people are not emerging from 70 years of repression or order to become irrelevant. Instead they should be preparing to play the major role on the world stage that is worthy of a great and free people.

I know enough about the great resources of your land and the resourcefulness of your people to be optimistic about your long-term future. But only you can be the architects of your own destiny. Our interests are in a stable and peaceful transition of the Soviet Union from what it is today, the sick man of Europe, into a modern and democratic nation. We wish that for the same of your people. We als wish it for the sake of the world, be cause democratic nations are les threatening to their neighbors and mo reliable as partners.

Some now say that the time ha come to sacrifice the democratic re forms you have begun in the interests stability. But now that you have begu the process, it will be impossible t stop. It is possible to have stability with out reform in the short run, but in th long run there be no stability without re form. I am not saying it will be a smoot and simple process. Democracy canno be perfect because democracy is gov ernment by people, and people are no perfect.

You are entitled to expect us not to in terfere in your internal affairs. But w cannot be indifferent to what is happen ing on the territory of another nuclea superpower. You have won the admira tion of the civilized world by telling th shocking truth about your recent his tory. Now, when we see attempts t stifle this truth again, shouldn't we pas the same moral judgement that led us t applaud Soviet reforms to start with even if this time a moral judgement ma have to go against you? To paraphras Andrei Sakharov, how can one trust th foreign policy of a government tha persecutes its own people?

For too many years, both of our great na tions had to subordinate our foreig policies, indeed very often our domest policies, to the confrontation between Eas and West. The Cold War was enormous expensive, both in energy and other kind of resources that we hope can now be ex pended more productively. We will con tinue to disagree on some issues. But be cause we are the two major powers in th world, we also have many areas where w can work together: the environment, an titerrorism, the war against drugs, the pro liferation of new weapons technologies and , as we were reminded in the Gul making sure the world is safe from brut aggressors like Saddam Hussein. I am no talking about bringing the world into a ne age of perpetual harmony. Instead I am thinking about our historic responsibility t exploit the opportunity provided by th winding down of the Cold War to build more stable and mutually beneficial re lationship between the two most powerfu nations in the world.

In the life of a nation, moments lik this come once in ten generations. Yo have begun a process that if success fully completed will guide the course o the Soviet Union for many more gene ations to come. But if you fail to live u to the challenge of the process you hav begun, what started in triumph coul end in tragedy. Your moment of trut has arrived.

# A View from the Pacific

## Western coast economists lost confidence in Europe. Asia is a better place for business, they insist

*Joel Kotkin*

Amidst the current hard times, it is understandable that many in the Soviet Union would look westwards – towards Europe and particularly Germany – for economic salvation. President Gorbachev, for instance, speaks hopefully of sharing a "common European home" with the more prosperous nations of Western Europe.

Yet such a strategy, with its heavy emphasis on linkage to a united Germany, also presents perils for the long-term future of Russia and whatever other republic which chose to stay within the Union structure. For despite the current mood of Europhoria, the reality is that the best future for Russia – as well as its continental twin, the United States – lies in balancing its linkage to Europe with a stronger tie to Asia's ascendant economy.

Indeed Europhoria – an almost mythical belief in the continent's coming resurgence – represents something of a regression in the history of world economic thought. It is embraced by many in the elite circles of both Russia and the east coast of North America like the "second coming," a return to the era of European preponderance of the earlier imperial era.

I predict the final death knell of Europhoria in North America will come in the next few months when the negative news about the lacklustre performance of many top European companies finally seeps into the rather lazy and self-obsessed American press. When the problems of Phillips, Bull, Renault, Fiat, Olivetti and other giants are more widely understood, the relative weakness of much of corporate Europe – particularly in high-technology electronics and automobiles – will become more obvious even on the U.S. East Coast. Indeed by the mid-1990s, according to the Dataquest consulting firm, Europe will rank fourth in the world production of semiconductors, behind Japan, the United States and non-Japanese Asia!

Already some cutting-edge American business – particularly that portion that wishes to be big players in the next century – are beginning to shake off Europhoria, realizing that the key growth markets of the future lie not in Europe, but in Asia. Last year sales of US products to Asia actually exceeded those to Europe by more than $10 billion. Realistic attitudes will lead companies – whether based in San Francisco or Stuttgart – to focus on the realities of the emerging Pacific Century.

Nowhere is this more clear than here in California, where Asia now accounts for over 45 percent of exports, 60 percent greater than Europe's total. "For the aggressive business, it's better to go into a moving, dynamic economy like Asia," notes Gladys Moreau, the President of International Intelligence Services in Marina del Rey, California. "Europe is a mature market and has a socialist tendency that works against entrepreneurship. It will never be that dynamic."

These developments should affect thinking in Moscow as well as Marina del Rey. Russia's current attracting for Europe should not allow it to miss out on greater potential opportunities in the Pacific, particularly California, Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Southeast Asia. These regions by the mid-1990s will dominate virtually every leading technological field, from biotechnology to microelectronics.

Finally blind allegiance to Europe ignores the lessons of history. Ever since Peter the Great, Russians have tended to look almost with mindless admiration at Western Europe. In the process they have imported not only the good aspects of European society – such as technology and science – but also the welfare state, Marxism and fascism.

Suspect that in the new "European order" foreseen by its West European architects, the place of Russia and indeed all of Eastern Europe is likely to be quite definitely in the back alleys.

This is not to say that Russia should not trade or look for a future in Europe. But it should not do so without also looking with at least equal enthusiasm eastwards to Asia and the Pacific. Here Russia's vast resources are potentially of greater value to expanding and ascendant economic forces. It is also in the vast Asia-Pacific-California zone that Russia's greatest technological strengths – particularly in aerospace and materials science – will find their best partners and markets.

By location and racial affinity your society retains within it deeply Asiatic roots and attractions. These are not to be ignored, or suppressed, but further developed as a means of linking to the emerging new Asia-centered world order.

Here in California, we look forward to a future as a bridge between the aging, but still wealthy European world and ascendant world of the Asia-Pacific region. Like California, Russia, too, lives astride the two great centers of traditional civilization. Like us, you should find your future where your history and geography places lead – to a role as a central player on the bridge of commerce between Europe and Asia.

SAN FRANCISCO




*Drawing from Der Spiegel (Germany)*

**Joel KOTKIN** is the co-autor of *The Third Century: America's Resurgence in the Asian Era*. He is a senior fellow at the Center for the New West in Denver.

# Saved from an Iraqi jail

## How Moscow pressurized Baghdad into releasing a CBS team



At the beginning of March Iraqi authorities transferred four CBS correspondents who had spent 41 days in Iraqi captivity to the Soviet embassy in Baghdad. The whole world thanked President Gorbachev for the humane efforts to facilitate the journalists' release. The Soviet President's Press Assistant, Vitaly Ignatenko, tells how the operation started:

*At one of the first few meetings after the allied bombings of Iraq started, I was approached by Mr. Joe Ritchey, head of the Moscow CBS bureau, who told me that a team of US journalists was in a bad trouble in Iraq. A camera crew headed by Robert Simon vanished somewhere in the border area between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Ritchey asked me for help. When I got back to the Kremlin, I contacted the Iraqis but all they told me was that they had heard about the crew but did not know anything in particular...*

In the last few weeks before the war started the Iraqi authorities expelled practically all foreign journalists from the country. Only two journalists remained in Baghdad: CNN's veteran correspondent Peter Arnett and Alfonso Rojo, of the Spanish daily *El Mundo*. At the end of February, however, Saddam Hussein decided that it was better to admit journalists to the area exposed to US bombings: he calculated that reports from devastated Baghdad districts might force the international community to change its attitude to the Gulf War.

All information coming from Iraq was harshly censored. Soon the International Press Institute announced that the Iraqi authorities applied pressure on journalists in an attempt to make them report only what Iraq wanted the world to know. It was after that that five Western correspondents disappeared.

The first reporter to vanish was Bruce Cheesman, of London's *Evening Standard*. He went missing in Baghdad on the night the Allied bombings began and for some time nobody heard of him. Later he telephoned his mother in Australia to tell her not to worry. Then, in a mysterious development, Cheesman sent a hand-written report about the effect of the raids on the Iraqi capital to the *Evening Standard* via a CNN courier in Iraq...

Four more correspondents vanished on January 21. Three days later, CBS News' president Eric Ober addressed Mikhail Gorbachev with the following letter:

A serious situation has arisen that makes the CBS News address you for help.

Four CBS News journalists covering the Gulf war went missing on Monday, January 21. A Saudi military patrol found their abandoned car in about 8 km to the south from the Kuwaiti border near the village of Al Roqwi – an area actively controlled by Iraqi troops.

In the car we found the passport of one of the crewmen. No signs of violence were visible...

The crew included:

**Robert Simon,** head correspondent for the Middle East, US citizen;

**Peter Bluff,** London bureau chief of CBS news, poducer, citizen of Great Britain;

**Roberto Alvarez,** a cameraman of the CBS Miami bureau, US citizen;

**Juan Cladera,** technician of the CBS Miami bureau, US citizen.

You will understand our concern for the fate of our colleagues. The desire to see them safely back makes us turn to you for help.

The letter was received in the Kremlin in that very evening.

Says Ignatenko:

*In the evening I told Mikhail Gorbachev about the American journalists' drama. The President listened with great attention and then instructed, all organizations somehow involved in our relations with Iraq to take all the possible steps to have the journalists released. Days went by and still all we heard was that the TV crew was nowhere to be found, that no one had heard of it and that it had vanished without trace. At last, Academician Yevgeny Primakov set off for his visit to Iraq. One of the instructions he had from President Gorbachev was to get more information about the fate of the American journalists. While in Iraq, Primakov put this question sharply before Foreign Minister Aziz and Saddam Hussein himself. Tariq Aziz promised he would inquire about the missing journalists, but no concrete information was to come...*

Meanwhile, the government of Saudi Arabia tightened control over journalists' movements in the conflict area. A com-

muniqué issued by the Saudi Defence Ministry said the missing crew had been on "an unsponsored and unescorted trip, a direct violation of established US-Saudi media ground rules." The communiqué added: "All members of the news media now in Saudi Arabia are reminded that travel into restricted areas without official escort or written permission is strictly prohibited."

Later Robert Simon told that their crew did travel in the desert unescorted.

Their car stopped about 8 km away from the border. They saw an Iraqi military jeep in about 200 metres. "I started calculating whether we could still escape," Simon recalls, "and understood we won't make it." Meanwhile the jeep neared the TV crew car, the Iraqis searched the journalists, pushed them into the jeep and headed for Kuwait.

The CBS crew was charged with espionage, and held first in a Kuwaiti bunker and then at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.

Espionage is a standard charge Saddam Hussein incriminates all journalists with. In February this year, Patrick de Noirmont, a Reuters correspondent, was found lying in an Iraqi jeep handcuffed, blindfolded and beaten up. He said later that he and a colleague – the photographer, Laurent van der Stockt, had been captured by the Iraqis, accused of spying, beaten up and threatened with execution.

The CBS and the captured crew's relations and friends, and four thousand foreign journalists who signed a petition in defence of the crew had every reason to worry for the fate of the four CBS men. Everybody remembered the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a British Iranian who had worked for the British *Observer* and was hanged last March in Iraq; Saddam charged him with spying for Israel...

Of the four US journalists captured on January 21, Robert Simon was the only professional war reporter. The Gulf war was his second military reporting experience since Vietnam.

"They beat us with canes, with sticks, on the legs, on the head," said Simon of his captors. "I was in a room being interrogated and I knew my three friends were outside the room in a hall. The door was closed... But when they were getting to the important questions they opened the door and they beat Juan, Peter and Roberto so that they would scream and I would hear them scream while they were asking me questions and beating me at the same time."

Psychologically, the most difficult experience were the Allied bombings raids of Baghdad. After they were freed, the Iraqis carried them around Baghdad so that they saw what the US air force had done to the capital city of Iraq. Juan Cladera said they were almost killed during one bombing raid – the Iraqis never took them to bomb shelters. "I heard the plane. Then I heard the bomb coming. The sounds were incredible. And I knew it was coming to me. So I just crouched in a corder," recalled Cladera. "Rubble fell all over me. Half the room was absolutely gone." Cladera was able to make his way to Simon's room.

The doctor who examined the journalists after they were released found them in a good shape, despite everything they had suffered. At least, the beating had not been too severe and their sanity survived by a miracle. The doctors were worried most over the journalists' extreme fatigue...

"I spent time talking," said Alvarez. "I talked a lot – whispered about everything: plans when I got out, my family, my son, about food. Dreams of food became so intense that I finally had to force myself to stop them."

Simon dreamed of food too. "At one point," he recalls. "I heard someone brought up onto the floor. I heard him being kicked. Four times. But I was so deep at that moment – I was walking down Broadway with an ice cream in one hand and popcorn in the other – that I couldn't pay attention to the kicking."

On February 20, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State of the USA, sent a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev:

"Dear Mr. President.

Although I am reluctant to impose on you, I felt it important to write you about an urgent humanitarian matter.

I understand from Mr. Laurence Tisch, Chairman of the Board of CBS (on which I also serve), that your government has taken a helpful interest in the case of four missing CBS correspondents. They were apparently captured by Iraqi forces several weeks ago. Mr. Tisch has asked that you urgently approach the Iraqi government about the journalists' welfare.

If you would be able to help in this matter, Mr. President, I know that it would be seen as a generous humanitarian gesture not only by the friends and families of the newsmen, but by all Americans. It would not be appropriate for me to suggest to you the most effective means to undertake such a contact, but I am sure you will know best how to handle the matter."

Some Western media wrote later that the Kissinger letter played the decisive part in the saving of the CBS men. Vitaly Ignatenko, however, gives a different interpretation of the events:

*The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, arrived in Moscow on February 22. Yevgeny Primakov and I approached him right at President Gorbachev's office at almost 3 a.m. Primakov asked Aziz once again to speak to the Iraqi President about an immediate release of the journalists. At that point Aziz said he had heard something about the CBS crew. He said he believed one of the journalists was a distant relation to the President of Nicaragua. I understood that if Aziz knew this small detail – one of the journalists' being related to the President of Nicaragua – and few people at CBS knew that, this meant that the journalists were kept in Baghdad. I told Primakov about that. Then Primakov demanded that journalists be released.*

When before the Allied action against Iraq started and after Primakov made his first trip to Iraq, Saddam Hussein started liberating Western hostages, many people were trying to guess what price the Soviet Union would pay. Moscow's efforts at liberating even Soviet people captured anywhere in the world have never been a spectacular success. In this case, Soviet diplomacy used an untraditional means – brought pressure to bear on its former partner and ally.

*At around 11 p.m. of March 2, we got a telegram," said Ignatenko. "It said that the journalists were free. I called CBS and told them their colleagues were free...*

*I. Lagunina*

# A confederation or a community?

**Yugoslav lessons for Soviet reformers**

*Pavel Kandel*
*Cand. Sc. (History)*

Recent events in Yugoslavia are instructive for Soviet reformers because a similar situation has arisen in their own country. The similarity is explained by the existence of two federative state systems which encompass nations with varying religions, cultures and histories. Many direct analogies also exist in the type of mutual ties and in the structure of relations between the members of the federation. Yugoslavia has its Russia, Baltic republics, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Central Asian republics.

Another thing common to the two countries is their "socialist past," despite the specific features of "self-managed and non-aligned" Yugoslavia. Since many of the processes which have led Yugoslavia to its present state are being repeated with some delay in our country, it would be reasonable to look at Yugoslavia as a laboratory model for the Soviet Union.

Today the nationalities problem is not merely the most urgent problem facing the two countries. It has called their very existence into question. There are certainly many concrete historical peculiarities in the origin and content of the national processes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. However, many common features can also be found in them.

A totalitarian state (an empire before the socialist period) was the only form of policy in these countries. The collapse of totalitarianism cast doubts on previous forms of state organization. The prolonged political and economic inefficiency of the central government and its inability to carry out the reform needed by the society became a long-term source of centrifugal tendencies. It is not important that the paralysis of central rule was caused by the struggle between various social and political forces in the Soviet Union and by the conflict between the republics in Yugoslavia.

## The conflict between republics

The peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia who historically assumed the role of the leader in

building the state, have lost their "civilized superiority" as the only factor thanks to which their leading status was recognized. A logical consequence of this situation was a change in the relation between the national statuses and ethnic tension caused by the desire of some nations to establish themselves in the new role and of other nations to retain their former role by force.

One more source of the confrontation between republics was and remains the distinction between the trends in their political development. The social and economic crisis also plays its part, because the diminishing volume of resources, goods and means has to be divided between the increasing number of subjects that need them. The national communities and national-territorial regions were naturally among the first pretenders to the public wealth. As a result, a sociologically established rule comes into effect: during an economic crisis the distance between nations increases and the number of ethnic conflicts grows.

The Yugoslav situation shows that even obvious achievements in overcoming the crisis can be sacrificed for the sake of satisfying national ambitions. Indicative in this respect in the fate of Premier Markovic, the only head of government who was able to win broad popularity. Tangible successes in bridling hyperinflation, a substantial improvement in trade and payments balance, the saving of the country from financial bankruptcy, the growth of currency reserves, the effective launching of market reforms, and broad prospects of establishing closer ties with the European Community – such was the record with which Ante Markovic, head of the Union of Reformist Forces, joined the election campaign. However, his Union achieved rather modest results. The victorious nationalist parties immediately questioned the prospects of the reforms and the country's future. This vividly proves the strength of the nationalist potential and the relatively independent dynamics of nationalism.

It is not accidental, in my opinion, that nationalism has become a very powerful, if not the dominant, force in the post-totalitarian society, even in states relatively homogeneous nationally. The collapse of totalitarianism creates a wilderness in which the most preserved natural, primary forms of socialization – national ones – are the first to return to life. Incidentally, nationalism is not only a legacy of totalitarianism but also its outcome, a direct product of the activity of the League of Communists in the recent, critical period. The party initiated this policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In conditions of another socio-economic and political crisis national revival was counterposed to the liberal democratic progress of the Yugoslav society.

The "divide and rule" policy allowed the hierarchy to retain its monopoly of power and to replace the emerging ideological and political pluralism by a rivalry between republican elites. It was in those years that the Yugoslav republics declared their sovereignty, the "socialist federation was renewed," and the transformation of the formerly united "partocracy" into a coalition of national hierarchies began.

## Playing on the national idea

After Tito's death, the rivalry between the party and government elites of the Yugoslav republics and their authoritarian rule in their domains led to a paralysis of central rule. The League of Communists, which assumed the role of guardian of "national rivival," naturally became its victim. The ideological and political differentiation in its ranks is giving way to national-territorial differentiation.

The radical-reformist orientation of the League of Communists organization in Slovenia and Croatia is opposed by national neo-Bolshevism in Serbia. The desire of Slovenia and Croatia to preserve a confederalized federation or to increase its confederative character comes in conflict with the mass movement in Serbia for a return to the centralized federation. Having become a powerful generator of separatism and having driven the country to the verge of disintegration, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is breaking up. The setback of the Communist reformers in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia in the first multiparty elections and the victory of successors to the League of Communsts (who took up the slogans of their nationalist opposition) in Serbia and Montenegro have imparted a new dimension to the conflict. Different social systems are taking shape in different federal units. The preservation of a single state becomes even less probable.

The reader himself can easily draw an analogy with the processes taking place in the Soviet Union, and the lessons of such an analogy are instructive. The "renewal of the socialist federation of sovereign republics" is only a means of delaying and deepening the crisis of socialism as a social system. Twenty years ago a renewal brought about temporary successes in Yugoslavia, then on the periphery of the socialist system. However, such successes can hardly be expected today. A confederative or confederalized structure can weaken ethnic discord, lessen social and political tension, and avert the threat of an "all-Union Lebanon." However, one should not entertain the illusion that such a structure will prove lasting, durable and economically effective.

In the post-totalitarian society political games with an attractive national idea advantageous to its initiators proves disastrous in the long run. An alliance with nationalism ends in a quick defeat for reformist democratic movements. The genetic kinship of neo-Bolshevism or authoritarianism with nationalism promises success, but only in the initial stages. The stormy reaction of all "other" nationalisms leads to the break-up of a single state. Since the historic time of neo-Bolshevism is over, party bureaucrats who take up slogans of nationalism come to realize soon that they are putting the cart before the horse. For nationalists, neo-Bolshevism becomes onerous stuff which has to be replaced by traditional values.

In post-totalitarian society, the past and the present disunite people, and only the future can unite them. However, a strong unifying idea is needed for this purpose. But there is no room for such an idea in multinational states like the USSR or Yugoslavia. Nationalism becomes a successor to totalitarianism. Hence such alternatives as an economically thriving federation or an economic crisis do not exist. In reality, the choice exists between a coordinated dismantling of the united state and its violent disintegration. The most safe variant, even if intermediate, would apparently be the transformation of the former into an economic and defence community with an assymetric structure, namely, with the nucleus in the form of a federation of republics prepared to unite and allied states which will independently determine the degree of their participation in a new community.

*Photo from Stern*

# Bundeswehr marches East

**Surreal notes about the weapons, living conditions and prospects of the German army and about how Soviet soldiers feel side by side with the Bundeswehr**

The German Ministry of Defence invited a group of FRG–based foreign correspondents to visit one of the Bundeswehr garrisons located in what used to be the GDR. We were to arrive at the military sector of the airport in Bonn from where a Luftwaffe transport plane shuttles civilian and military bureaucrats to and from Berlin. From a distance the transport plane, with a big black cross painted on the fuselage, seemed very familiar to me. As we came closer, I realized I was right – the plane was a Soviet-built Ilyushin 62–M.

It was the first surprise of our somewhat surreal journey into the past – into the ex-German Democratic Republic.

## ...uncertainty in one's eyes

The village of Beelitz near Berlin used to be the deployment area of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division of the East German National Volksarmee (NVA). A Soviet vintage T–34 tank was set as a memorial atop of a huge granite pedestal. Behind it one could see the iron gates of the garrison with the Bundeswehr symbols already painted on them. Inside the garrison compound, Bundeswehr recruits sweated, beaking down and reassembling Kalashnikov assault rifles and Makarov pistols. Indeed, everything has been mixed up in this world.

The 1st Mechanized Infantry Division was one of the best units in the GDR. Its Beelitz garrison boasted multistorey prefab barracks looking much like Moscow residential blocks, a fully-asphalted territory, warm garages, rooms for soldiers each housing no more than 4, azure tablecloths and curtains. By East German standards, to say nothing of Soviet ones, the place seemed a paradise. For the Bundeswehr, it is only a so-so garrison.

While we dined at the garrison messroom (the meal consisted of soup, meat stew with boiled potatoes and vegetables, chocolate ice-cream and coffee) I spoke with two recruits. Before they were called up, one of them worked as a cook and the other as a driver. They seemed happy in the Bundeswehr uniform, because civilian life is too unstable and unpredictable nowadays, and they could easily find themselves unemployed.

The Bundeswehr term of service is 12 months. Servicemen are allowed to leave their units for weekends. On weekdays service time ends at four thirty and soldiers are free to go into town for dancing or elsewhere. A private gets over DM 400 a month (a Soviet Army private deployed in the former GDR gets only DM 25). Both recruits I spoke to came to the garrison in their own cars: one shared his father's Skoda and the other drove a Ford Taunus he had bought cheaply from a West German relation.

All the recruits in the division were called up from East German towns and villages. As for the officers, they are both from the East and the West. Officers from East Germany obviously feel ill at ease wearing the uniform of yesterday's "class enemy". One can easily tell a former East German officer by the tightened belt (they don't wear belts too tight in the Bundeswehr), by the way he walks, the absence of a name tag above the left breast pocket and the uncertain look in his eyes.

After October 3, 1990, the date of German unification, 100,000 officers and men of the East German NVA and 47,000 NV civilian workers put on Bundeswehr uniforms. All the 330 NVA generals and admirals were retired on pension and only 3 of the East German top brass were allowed to continue service as Bundeswehr advisors. Recently the number of former NVA servicement recruited sto the Bundeswehr has been halved and today's figure is approximately 40,000 recruits, 19,000 NCOs and re-engaged men and 10,000 officers. After the military unification is over, the strength of the Bundeswehr in the former GDR will be 50,000.

So far, most officers of the division are Bunderswehr officers dispatched to serve in the East. All commanding officers and political indoctrination officers of the division were fired immediately after the unification.

One does not need to be a good psychologist to understand how the Ossis feel towards the Wessis and vice versa. For example, privates get approximately the same amount of money in the East as in the West of Germany. At the same time a Bundeswehr colonel gets DM 5,500 a month which is twice the monthly pay of a NVA colonel who joined the Bundeswehr. Very often "old" and "new" Bundeswehr officers serve in same units.

However, the difference in pay is not the main problem. The two different visions, mentalities and ways of life are much harder to reconcile. October 3 was also the day of unification of two antagonistic armies trained to regard each other as potential enemies. NVA officers and men have to re-orient themselves in a rapidly changing environment and often start careers from a scratch in the context of tough competition. Many NVA servicemen worry whether they would be finally allowed to continue service in the Bundeswehr. The decisive word will come from an independent commission whose task is to see to it that only officers who have broken away from their past, had had no ties with the East German secret police (Stasi) and are really devoted to democracy serve in the new German Army.

Another difficulty is the different command concept. East Germany's Nationale Volksarmee followed the Soviet model. Both in combat and training conditions, the commanding officer's order determined his subordinate's every step. The Bundeswehr advocates a different principle. Bundeswehr COs' orders specify only the ultimate objective and generally orientate servicemen. The actual carrying out of the order is the concern of the troops themselves. Bundeswehr officers believe this approach helps make troops more independent, capable and responsible.

The condition of servicemen in the two armies was totally different too. Brought up in an atmosphere of law regulated freedom and profound respect for human life and individuality, West soldiers find it difficult to understand such realities as "dedovshchina" (bullying of young recruits by older ones) and "neustavnyie otnosheniya" (abuses by servicemen).

## Much metal, little brains

Col. Rieck, deputy Co of the division, found time to meet journalists despite his preoccupion with a number of other concerns. In particular he told the newsmen about the division's priority tasks.

One of the most difficult tasks is guarding combat equipment and stockpiles of ammunition. Besides the division's organic materiel, the garrison also has stockpiles of weapons which used to be operational with the disbanded Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse (self-defence units of workers),

Gesellschaft fur Sport and Technic (the sports and technical society) and the Ministry of State Security. This means 400,000 pistols, self-loading rifles and submachine guns and thousands of tons of ammunition. We saw several warehouses filled with grimly-looking khaki crates with inscriptions in the Russian language.

The Bundeswehr has not yet decided what it will do with these stockpiles of explosives. I suggested to the escorting officer that all the ammunition be simply fired in some remote place, but the officer said this was impossible. First, the great amount of the resulting smoke would damage the ecology, he said, and second, the East German ammunition could not be used at all according to the Bundeswehr safety regulations: the rounds have only one fuse and one safety lock each. Bundeswehr regulations require two fuses and two safety locks for each round of ammunition. The only way out seems to be to disassemble each round manually, separating the powder, the bullet and the cartrige. This is going to be a costly effort.

So will be parting with Soviet-built armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. The Bundeswehr does not want to adopt them for two reasons: first, the vehicles do not meet uniform NATO standards and their user would be heavily dependent on suppliers of spare parts. Second, the vehicles are very expensive to maintain and consume too much diesel fuel. It seems that most Soviet-built combat vehicles will have to be scrapped, although some of them may be transferred to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These countries have displayed an interest in obtaining the vehicles, but insist that Bonn pay a compensation for their consent to take over the tons of Soviet-built armour.

Shortly before the unification of Germany, the Soviet military made an attempt to prevent some of the Soviet-made combat materiel organic with the NVA from falling into NATO's hands – the Soviet military feared NATO would learn all Soviet military secrets. The attempt failed, however. Juridically, Soviet-made combat vehicles and other hardware procured by the NVA was the property of the NVA and, logically, of the NVA's legal successor, the Bundeswehr. Bundeswehr officers have no kind words for the formidable Soviet hardware, except the MIG 29 jet, they say Soviet weapons are just much metal and little brains.

## Food parcels from the vanquished

One of the Bundeswehr's most delicate problems is its relationship with the units of the Soviet Western Army Group still deployed in the territory of the former GDR, side by side with the Bundeswehr garrisons. All Soveit troops are to leave Germany before the end of 1994. This means that Soviet will have to co-habit with the Bundeswehr for three years to come. This really unprecedented situation, however, did not seem to have affected the morale of Col. Dmitry Timashkov, spokesman for the Soviet Western Army Group whom the journalists met instead of visiting a Soviet Army unit.

The Ossis are trying on the Bundeswehr uniform

Colonel Timashkov lectured the journalists at length about the Allied victory over Nazism, the history of the formation and renaming of the Western Army Group. At present, the colonel said, the Soviet troops were adapting to new conditions. The troops were getting ready for withdrawal and the combat and political training of the troops proceeded perfectly according to the plans...

One of the problems facing the Soviet military is the dramatic shortage of flats for WAG officers back home. According to a bilateral accord Bonn will allocate DM 7,8 billion for the construction of flats for Soviet officers. The money will be spent on the construction of four plants producing pre-fab construction elements and 36,000 flats for servicemen. Col. Timashkov said 19,000 flats would still have to be built, which would require an extra DM 4,2 billion. The colonel did not specify the source of the extra money, but obviously, Bonn will be billed for those flats as well...

"Combat training and the upcoming withdrawal are not our only preoccupations today, said Col. Timashkov continuing his one-hour lecture. We are expanding contacts and ties with the public and political organizations, collectives of factories, plants, organizations and institutions of learning, with the local population... We are establishing business-like relations with the units of Bundeswehr–Kommando "Ost" with the purpose of promoting confidence between the servicemen of our two armies."

The WAG has invented an interesting formula to describe the Soviet military's attitude towards the Bundeswehr. Obviously, the Bundeswehr continues to be mentioned in Soviet military textbooks and manuals as a potential enemy. Times have changed, however. Still the military can't make themselves call the Bundeswehr a partner. This is how Col. Timashkov identified the Bundeswehr: "The army of a state which has signed the treaty on partnership, cooperation and good-neighbourliness with the Soviet Union."

All our efforts to get the Soviet colonel to speak about the morale of the Soviet troops were in vain: he kept repeating that the general mood was business-like and the moral climate was healthy.

Werner von Scheven, Deputy Commander of the Bundeswehr-Kommando "Ost" has a different opinion about the Soveit troops' morale:

"We see that changes in this part of Germany have caused some uncertainty and confusion among the Soviet troops. This could not have been otherwise. The Soviet troops had to re-organize their supply systems according to free market laws. In the past, Soviet troops were supplied with everything they needed through state organizations. I can imagine how Kameraden feel now. We must pay due respect to the efforts the Soviet command takes to observe its committments, preserve discipline and order among troops which no army can do without. Such efforts are worthy of great respect."

One of the Bundeswehr officers who escorted us through the garrison was less diplomatic: "The Soviet troops used to be an army of liberators and victors in East Germany. Now they are leaving, carrying food parcels from the Germans they had once defeated..."

...After he said goodbuy to the journalists, Col. Timashkov got into his service car and drove away. I noted that like the Bundeswehr recruit, the Soviet colonel was also driving a Ford. The only difference was that the recruit drove his own battered Taunus, while the Soviet colonel had a brand-new service Scorpio.

*Nikita Zholkver,*
our special correspondent

BEELITZ–BERLIN–BONN

*TASS photo*

# Will the Soviet Union overcome itself?

*Sergei Karaganov,*
D.Sc. (History)

**Having won WWII, Moscow virtually lost the postwar peace battles. Today it has a chance of victory**

The new state of affairs now taking shape in Europe allows one to take a new look at many things customary in the recent past.

Our country and the West have gotten used to believing that the postwar settlement which left under Soviet control a broad "buffer zone" from the Baltic to the Black Sea, had been a major political and geostrategic achievement. Those in the Soviet Union were proud of expanding the zone of socialism, tried to strengthen the "buffer" zone and consolidate what it had obtained.

To ensure this a system of political and military-political ties was set up with a view to strengthening Soviet influence in the area. With this goal in mind in the 1960s, and to an increasing extent, the Soviet Union subsidized them through unprofitable price scissors (low, compared with world prices, for the traditional Soviet export items, relatively high on a considerable part of imports from East European countries). Such an expansion of the USSR social, political and military influence was considered in the West unacceptable, gave rise to a policy of deterrence and cold war. The Western architects of the Yalta conference as a result of which the USSR obtained a sphere of domination in East Europe, were accused if not of treachery then at least of having committed heavy blunder.

Only now it is becoming clear that the victory of the Soviet Union in a peaceful postwar settlement was, to a large extent, a Pyrrhic victory. Our people and the army defeated fascism in the Great Patriotic War, upheld the country's independence, but the policy actually lost postwar settlement and postwar peace.

## Everything for defence!

With weak allies, the USSR was put in a position in which it was compelled to resist and balance the hostile coalition actually consisting of all the industrially advanced countries. Thus, the country failed to carry out postwar conversion. Peace reigned for four and a half decades but the economy continued to be run a semimilitary regime, exhausing the resources and the people.

The development of even formally non-military branches of the national economy, such as transport, supply lines, power engineering and most branches of machine-building was distorted, yielding to the needs of defence and military production. For decades the country will deal with the results of these distortions which we disregard quite often.

Confrontation in many respects cut off the country from the achievements of science and technology, the morality and spirit of the most developed part of civilization. The semblance of success in spreading the Soviet model of development of East Europe and, at the same time, the hostile Western policy aimed at isolation, deterrence and pressure strengthened the positions of Stalinism and conservatives, delayed the coming of reforms. And the delay made them much more painful and difficult.

As a result of postwar settlement, if it can be so referred to, the USSR found itself in a way in still greater isolation in Europe than before the war. And this after it had formed during the war a strategic alliance with the leading Western countries. In the 1940s–1960s this isolation was even worse in many respects than in the 1930s when the US SR could use Western equipment and technology for the country's industrialization. Before the war, the USSR could play on difference in interests, on contradictions between Western powers, to obtain economic and political advantages. After the war and the formation of NATO its sphere of action became sharply narrower.

And perhaps the most paradoxical thing is that if the "geostrategic buffer" had been useful at all, it was in a rather limited way and only for a few years. In the first postwar decade the West simply did not have armies which even theoretically could threaten with invasion. Later, when the USSR came to possess a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons a conventional attack became merely impossible. And it was not planned as far as it is known. As to its aims, NATO was only a defensive alliance. Only NATO (American, to be more correct) nuclear strategy had serious offensive elements. And against the nuclear weapons the "buffer" was practically useless.

On the contrary, direct contact of powerful military groups incurred heavy military and political losses. The position of the troops deployed on advanced lines was vulnerable, particularly regarding the tactical nuclear strike which our military feared most of all.



*Drawing by Arkady Gusky*

The presence of these troops and, moreover, their use in 1953, 1956 and 1968 sparked off the comprehensible discontent of the population in the countries where they were deployed, was one of the most powerful generators of anti-Soviet sentiments which are now coming to the surface. Just like other political changes in neighbouring countries they show clearly how reliable our allies were.

## "Danger zone"

The promotion of spreading our own model of development, of expanding military and political influence which, as it seemed, created a "safety zone," in reality led to the creation of a "danger zone" which by the end of 1980s was ready for explosion. The changes took place more or less peacefully. But any delay to introduce them threatened with large-scale violence.

What looked as a potential threat of invasion by the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization consolidated the opposing group, strengthened the positions of the Rightists there and whipped up the arms race. The military build-up of other countries grew stronger threatening the USSR. Direct confrontation provoked a growth of offensive elements in the conceptions and combat formations of both alliances and undermined military stabilty.

The American nuclear strategy with a noticeable offensive (don't confuse this with aggressive) element, inherent in it up to this day was born for Europe. Its first task was "retribution" if the Soviet army attacked West European countries. Then, as it developed, it had to resolve the following tasks: deterrence of any strike on US territory, exerting political and psychological pressure on the USSR ("intimidation") and "extended deterrence" – instilling confidence in the allies that Washington will come to their aid with nuclear weapons if the outnumbering forces of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty launch an attack and the advanced groups of NATO forces were routed. According to nuclear theology such confidence is ensured only when the ability to maintain "escalation domination" – at all levels of a potential nuclear conflict – is achieved. It is easy to see that compared with the first the second criterion put higher demands on the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons. As one of the axioms of nuclear theory states, instilling confidence in an ally calls for a much greater amount of armaments than deterrence of the enemy. The use of this criterion was one of the most effective arguments in favour of deploying ever new systems.

Direct military confrontation also stepped up the escalation of conventional armaments in the West. For example, in 1950, when military confrontation in Europe was just taking shape, US ground forces numbered 12 divisions. In 1960 their number grew to 17. Four out of five added divisions were deployed in Europe.

In an attempt to compensate for Western nuclear superiority, to neutralize offensive elements in the NATO and US nuclear strategy, in the 1940s–1970s the USSR built up its conventional forces, maintaining superiority in this sphere. The conception that aroused serious apprehensions in the West and formed the basis of the Soviet military planning right up to the second half of the past decade and envisaged, if the war broke out, a resolute offensive deep into the enemy territory to quickly smash the main groups of its troops was not only the result of traditional thinking or striving to prevent war on its territory. Probably a resolute offensive was regarded as a measure to prevent the enemy from using nuclear weapons first.

Direct confrontation gave a mighty impetus and was almost the main reason for strengthening militarist tendencies in the policy of a number of leading Western countries, the US in particular.

## "Western front" – dismantled

Our troops are now withdrawing from neighbouring countries. This arouses a feeling of anxiety among many people. But what remains behind them? A broad, to a considerable extent, demilitarized, nuclear-free, although so far a relatively unstable zone of allied semi-neutral or de facto non-aligned states. The main impulses that stimulated the arms race on the continent are being suppressed.

The Soviet troop withdrawal and general political changes (and against this

background the pressure of social and demographic factors) are practically inevitable if, despite all the difficulties, perestroika continues and the Soviet Union fulfils its international commitments and goes on pursuing the foreign policy of the past years to bring about greater NATO arms cuts than envisaged by the Paris Treaty. Most tactical nuclear armaments whose targets are leaving and which obviously become meaningless will be reduced. The military presence of the USA, France and Britain on the territory of Germany will rather be cut two-three times over the next 4–6 years. Then its elimination may start. Together with the announced reductions, this may result in about 50 percent of the troops, now deployed there, remaining on the territory of Germany.

The dismantling of the Soviet "Western front," on a military level as well, is becoming obvious. The mechanism of creating a security system, much more advantageous than before, has been started. Thus, it has been planned to dismantle the Warsaw Treaty military structures by April.

A relatively quicker reduction of our military potentialities and structurers, fraught in principle with the emergence of certain advantages of NATO, is easily compensated with the existence in the USSR of a huge nuclear potential, in Europe included.

And perhaps the main thing – traditionally counted balances – even though had some importance in the past, quite often mythical, lose it now that the political changes quickly undermine not only the system of confrontation but also the previous notions of security, when it becomes increasingly evident that only a reasonable domestic and foreign policy can ensure it. Naturally, if it relies on minimum sufficient offensive and defensive potentialities. But they too must, to a greater extent, fit into the common system of cooperation and security.

But in order to finally win postwar settlement even in 50 years' time the Soviet Union must answer quite a few complicated questions, assess clearly and adequately react to a number of new realities or newly raised problems. Let's mention some of them: new NATO policy, new role of the EEC, the development of united Germany, the situation in Central and East European countries, outside threat to the security of the USSR and other European states; relative loss of influence by Soviet foreign policy, new balance of forces in Europe, new priority of the Far Eastrn policy.

## New *cordon sanitaire*?

But the main problem lies in the country itself. It is the growth of destructive separatist tendencies which, if they triumph in the main regions of the country will lead rather to its "lebanization," to an economic collapse, to the creation of a group of weak, unstable, backward-authoritarian but usually well armed state associations with steadily changing and claimed borders. Such developments will not only reverse the course of eliminating military confrontation. The Central and East European countries will rush to the West for military and political support and the West will find it hard, if not impossible, to keep from the temptation to create a new "sanitary cordon" separating prosperous Western Europe from the "sick war" of the continent.

The deep crisis faced by this country, the crisis of power, a more obvious exhaustion of the previous round of democraic development, temporary weakened influence of the democratic forces and increasing resistance put up by the conservative forces to the continuation of radical reforms make the rise of authoritarian tendencies practically inevitable. The foreign policy of recent years is being attacked more and more. All this cannot but harm its image and that of its leadership. Its position in the international area is becoming more complicated.

But if the temporary growth of authoritarianism is accompanied by a step back from the policy of transition to market relations or its serious delay, this momentum will become exhausted rather quickly. Such a retreat will actually doom the country to totalitarianism, and decay, will deprive it of its future which the West is prepared to invest in.

This may imply almost complete international-political, military-political and economic isolation of country and the republics situated on its territory. Compared with the condition which our country found itself in after the 1917 October Revolution, this situation will be better only for the reason that direct threat of military attack will be out of the question because of the presence of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if the totalitarian regeneration of the Soviet Union takes place, isolation may become fuller than 70 years ago. The country practically won't have even somewhat numerous ideological allies which Soviet Russia had after the revolution, there will be even no illusions about a likely way out of the crisis and isolation. For the second time the USSR will lose the postwar settlement and it will be for good for the generations alive today.



# Comments on *NT* articles

### The newspaper *Kuranty*

Idle speculation over Yeltsin's policy (as illustrated by a recent article by Marina Shakina in *New Times*) makes no sense. It is a bystander's view. Moreover, it is devoid of what is most important: a sense of life.

What I read in the weekly *New Times* is a distortion of the truth. It seems that the author does not see queues and want. Angered and humiliated Russia has rallied around Yeltsin. He speaks its language and in fact keeps back much of what people say.

**From Yuri Vlasov's article "It is the people, not Yeltsin, who are attacked"**

### The newspaper *Pravda*

Unfortunately, dear Tatiana Ilyinichna (Ivanova), with every new article it becomes increasingly difficult to believe you. No, I still believe in your personal honesty. However, your stand seems more and more false to me. Whom are you going to defend our people from? You say quite definitely: from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, you have written much about your adherence to non-violence. In the fifth issue of *New Times* for this year, which carries my letter and your reply, you wrote: "Democrats have never called for violence in any statement or article, at any meeting, on any occasion whatsoever." I question this statement. Some democratic publicists call for banning communist ideology, for instance. Can this be done without violence?

**From Natalya Morozova's article "It becomes increasingly difficult to believe you"**

### The newspaper *Vestnik Gruzii*

In its issue 52 of last year *New Times* published an article by V. Chalidze "Civilized order and public emotions," which is full of enmity towards the Georgian national liberation movement.

Various national forces of a Bolshevist colouring have always been traditional enemies of the Georgian people. But their traditional colouring gradually wears off, and now they appear in the guise of democrats. However, their national policy remains the same. A representative of such forces is former dissident V. Chalidze, who has lived in the West since 1972. He described Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the human rights movement in Georgia, as a chauvinist.

You, Mr Chalidze, and other so-called "democrats" serve the idea of the territorial integrity of the USSR, of preserving and renovating the Russian Empire.

**From Maguli Gagnidze's article "One can hope for the people's wisdom!"**

# Confession of a Vietnamese Dissident

*Duong Thu Huong*

**This "self-critical letter" reached the editorial office in a roundabout way. Hanoi friends of the author sent it to Moscow and his Moscow friends brought it to *New Times***

First. In an interview given in May, 1989, I said that it was a luxury to bring Marxism to Vietnam. The Vietnamese nation has emerged from the colonial cradle. The national community of people in a colony includes only sections with slavish essence to a lesser or greater degree. In a colonial society, economic and political conditions do not engender classes in the true sense of the word. The theory of class struggle, applied in such a society, leads only to mutual cannibalism, the destruction of spiritual traditions (mutual assistance, morals, customs, habits, aesthetic values and other qualities of a society) and economic potential. For instance, the land reform has led to the disappearance of the middle-class peasantry, the main supplier of agricultural products in the country. The reforms launched in the North in 1956 and in the South in 1978 put an end to private enterprise and brought industrial and handicraft production to a standstill as the people capable of organizing such production had been exterminated.

Marxism teaches that relations of production are a function of productive forces. But "Marxism" in Vietnam has turned everything upside down by taking the necessary prerequisite as a task to be put into effect. In this sense Vietnamese Marxists continued the traditions of Stalinism and Maoism. The party has imposed "socialist" and even "communist" relations of production on society in disregard of the fact that they do not at all correspond to the level of development of the productive forces.

The failure of the party's economic policy is a tragic consequence of voluntarism and the extreme left views of the party leadership. As a result, the socialist system as a whole and our country in particular are several decades behind the common progress of human civilization.

Second. In my letter to the organizing commission of the party's central committee of March, 1990, I expressed my objections to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "democratic centralism."

Since "the property of the whole people" is declared in our country, only two interpretations of this are possible: either all people are owners (the proletariat does not exist then, since a proletarian has no property) or no one owns anything, that is, all are proletarians.

In the first case there is no subject of the dictatorship, and in the second case its object is lacking.

Be that as it may, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not exist as such.

Radical changes have occurred in the world since The Communist Manifesto was published. At the end of last century English workers demanded the introduction of a work week not exceeding 48 hours. Today even the 40-hour work week, as in the Soviet Union, the "pioneer land of socialism," is one



Forward to prosperity

* A "self-critical letter" is a specific form of dealing with vacillating members in the Communist Party of Vietnam. A member who is asked to write such a letter to the party branch is usually reprimanded or warned, or even expelled from the party. This is what happened to Duong Thu Huong, a young female writer and the author of this letter. After a "self-critical letter" to the party branch of film studio No. 1 in Hanoi she was expelled from the party and is now under the open surveillance of the police who record all her meetings and contacts

of the longest in the industrial world.

With such drastic changes, the persistence with which our leaders cling to theoretical principles formulated more than 100 years ago is truly amazing.

In real life I certainly saw genuine proletarians, Vietnamese proletarians deprived of any property. They idle away their time at the Buoi and Ngoc Ha markets, at the Xanh flea market and a lot of nameless flea markets in the working-class suburbs of Hanoi, selling matches, soap, pants and T-shirts. For four months running their plants have been unable to pay them even their meagre wages, providing them with rations not enough even to keep them fed.



Democratization

I have also met other proletarians who, to keep body and soul together, were compelled to steal cement, pig iron and building materials at their plants and, caught red-handed, were sent to prison. The people who overcrowded prisons and corrective labour camps hardly suspected that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" exists in the country. In fact, it has been the dictatorship of the bureaucratic system which oppresses workers and other people.

"Democratic centralism" is a notion close to the dictatorship. Mankind has had many various dictatorships in its history. However, the "red dictatorship" has surpassed others in its cynicism and cruelty. For millennia the peoples of Asia suffered under the oppression of various tyrannies. The name of emperor Chin Shih Hwangti is a synonym for cruelty. His tomb was ravaged and the emperor was damned by his descendants. It will be recalled that he has on his conscience "only" 460 people buried alive and several thousand people mobilized for the construction of the Great Wall.

Let me say for comparison that during the Stalin rule one million people were executed, two million died in prison in 1937 and 1938, eight million were sent to prisons and camps, not counting tens of millions of peasants who were deprived of their property and rights.

No less horrible are the statistics of the "great cultural revolution" carried out by Maoist dictators.

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "democratic centralism" do not necessarily engender people like Stalin and Mao. However, were it not for the two principles there would have been no Stalin or Mao. This thought compels me to come out resolutely against them. I think that a genuine revolutionary must love his people and try to spare them new suffering if it was the suffering of the people which had inspired him or her to revolutionary struggle.

Third. Speaking in Ho Chi Minh City in April, 1990, I expressed the following opinion: communism became an attractive idea for mankind because it promised a society of justice. The revolution brought together millions of people under its banner. They defied privations, suffering and even death because the revolution called for justice, promising "freedom, equality and fraternity."

However, the promise contained in the communist song *The Internationale* – "We'll change forth with the old conditions and spun the dust to win the prize" – is a betrayal of these slogans, because it calls for a new hierarchy, and not universal fraternity. It becomes clear that, upon seizing power, the Communists will bring only more suffering and more injustice, and a new revolution to return what was taken away will appear on the agenda. This endless circle dooms mankind to bloody clashes and fratricide.

It seems to me therefore that a revolution which proclaims equality, fraternity and justice cannot express the interests of only one party or one class. It must be carried in the name of the people as a whole. In the moral sense, a revolution does not have the right to drown people in blood. It must bring them to the threshold of a new civilization. Members of society must not be played off against one another. Arms must not be given to some people so that they can rob others. The society must pursue a policy which would enable it to earn enough to satisfy the needs of all its members.

Fourth. In April, 1990, I allowed myself to "negate the past." Whatever the case, I was accused of having done that. Did I abuse glasnost to sow doubts of the correctness of party guidance? It seems that equally mad are those who, closing their eyes from the sun, complain about impenetrable darkness and those who, kindling a splinter in impenetrable darkness, admire the "bright sun." Truth has the final say. The wishes of one party, one system and one leader finally melt like wax when confronted with objective laws which people should learn to apprehend, not merely "recognize." As for me, I am only a grain of sand and there is no sense in my denying the past or the future, or anyone's guidance. There is no sense either in questioning the noble goals and sincerity of the founders of communist teaching, because they wanted to bring about

– democracy millions of times better than capitalist democracy;

– a man of a new type;

– a society with high morals;

– the flourishing of a creative initiative;

– and, most important, the growth of labour productivity exceeding all previous achievements.

However, socialism, tested by historical truth, has demonstrated

– the greatest vulnerability precisely in matters of democracy;

– disdain of objective laws to please the personality cult, voluntarism, moral decline and the decay of public values;

– the restraining of creative work and persecution of intellectuals;

– and, the main thing, hopeless lagging in labour productivity and product quality.

For decades, official ideologists have tried to make people believe in the indisputable superiority of abstract socialist values. However, all this has benn disproved by objective reality. That is why an ordinary member of society like me is unable to sow doubts about the correctness of the policy because these doubts have been sown by life itself.

Now regarding public rumours about my fate. It was rumoured that I was in prison. Such fears were only natural because in the Soviet Union and China millions of people disappeared without a trace and were thrown into prisons and camps. In our country, too, about 100 people are known to have disappeared one night. They had been condemned in Resolution 9 passed in December, 1963. Many people know that Vu Thu Hien, a writer, and Hoang Hung, a poet, spent nine and three years in prison respectively for violating "the rules of bicycling." Many other cases like this evidently prepared the ground for fears over my fate too. The only real way is the observance of legality and law and order.

Fifth, and finally. I am accused of violating party discipline. Article 18 of our party Rules says: "Party organizations and individual members must fulfil party decisions and are forbidden to dispute their correctness."

However, we have witnessed how

– the party Central Committee reprimanded Kim Ngoc, regional party secretary from Vinh Phu, for introducing the contract system in the countryside with a view to saving agricultural production from disaster; several days later the Central Committee adopted a decision on introducing the contract system;

– General Secretary Le Duan declared in 1975: "No enemy threatens our country any longer"; four years later our northern neighbour razed six provinces of our country to the ground;

– in 1982 the Hanoi city committee of the party advanced the task of "doing away with the food market"; shortly afterwards this decision was rescinded;

– until 1982 China had been considered our close friend linked with us "like lips and teeth"; after the war on the border, the following passage was added to the Constitution: "After 30 years of a war of liberation we were faced by Chinese hegemonists and their myrmidons in Cambodia. Developing our glorious traditions, we won historic victories over Cambodian reactionaries in the south-west and Chinese hegemonists in the north of the country."

At roughly the same time Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, who fled to China, was sentenced to death in absentia. However, recently, in May 1990, his family was allowed to go to China "to see" their relative. Simultaneously, our newspapers write about friendship with a country which was considered an irreconcilable enemy several years ago.

What must a naive party member do with regard to fulfilling Article 18 of the Rules? It will not please everyone to praise docilely today what he furiously defamed only yesterday, and vice versa.

I joined the party because I was fascinated by the fine goals of real socialism. I joined the party because I wanted independence, happiness and prosperity for the people. But I understand that instead of all this, I am becoming a witness to moral decay, the usurping of power and earthly blessings by the authorities while the people live in poverty and without any rights.

The last 70 years, the example of the Soviet Union has shown how dearly mankind pays for its golden dreams. And now our leaders admit with a sigh that there is no real socialism on earth. Li Peng in China gives the following theoretical explanation of this fact: "We are advancing towards socialism on the road of searches and trials. There is no universal model for the development of socialism."

It turns out that while drawing whole nations into processes in which they have to grope their way forward and leaders have the right to revise decisions adopted by mistake, the party lays claim to the exclusive right to remain outside criticism and deprives people of the right to independent thinking and evaluation of the situation, to a scientific analysis and, lastly, of the right to give advice.

This is immodest in general and for the party which considers itself "a party of the whole people and for the people," in particular. In such circumstances I personally cannot be satisfied with the role of a blind man led by a blind guide. There is a limit to the patience of the people. Exhausted and driven to despair by the war, the people are subjected to new trials in time of peace. At the time when the treasury is empty, the people are poor and sheer materialism prevails in the country, we witness numerous scandals connected with corruption which has assumed an unprecedented scale and shameless forms.

During the war Vietnam lost 12 million people. But for what purpose? I think that my compatriots killed in battle and by bombs and poisoned by Agent Orange gave up their lives for a different future. Their souls cannot find appeasement and their ashes weigh heavily on my heart. This is why I cannot keep silent and cannot remain inactive.

I know my shortcomings: lack of restraint, hastiness and hot temper. But in other respects my conscience is clear before the people. I have not stolen a single kopeck either from the people or the state. I did not compete for privileges or cushy jobs. I lead a Spartan way of life. That is why I do not have any reason for self-flagellation. Recently I have indeed spoken frankly about my understanding of what is taking place in the country. There is one reason for this: I profoundly believed in the statements of our leaders. For instance, a resolution adopted by a recent plenum of the party's central committee says: "It is necessary to develop forther democracy and glasnost in party life, in the activity of government bodies, in scientific activity, in mass media, in literature and the arts. This must be regarded as **the main trend of ideological work."**

Looking back at what happened to me, I am compelled to admit that I have made a mistake which honest people make all the time: I proved naive and credulous.

*Drawings by Choe (Vietnam)*

MORALS AND POLITICS

# Stationary stars of Charter–77

**Will the dissidents-turned-ministers stay loyal to their idealism of the 1970s?**

*Inna Rudenko,*

*New Times* own correspondent

I have always been interested in people who – contrary to what is called common sense (but in fact proves a submissive following of circumstances) and in spite of their seemingly hopeless efforts – quietly but stubbornly resisted and continue to resist notions which seem predominant at present, though not necessarily corrects ones.

At first I saw this man on television, when a conference of Charter–77 was shown. It was a gathering of people many of whom knew each other only by their signatures under a document which exploded the silence of intellectuals and initiated resistance to what was called "normalization" in Czecho-Slovakia.

Speaking on television, Jiri Vancura, one of Charter–77 leaders, said that the conference had to decide whether the organization should remain or not. Some people think that it has fulfilled its role in defending human rights and now, after the revolution, should leave the political scene, giving way to organizations more appropriate to present-day realities. There is also another opinion: Charter–77 should continue to exist. But is it only the fate of the organization that is being called in question?

## Ethics above politics

I arranged to meet with Jiri Vancura. He invited me to his home for a cup of tea. But our conversation lasted for several hours. Just as in the first minutes of our acquaintance, Jiri Vancura remained calm over the course of our entire conversation. His gentle and low voice seemed to emphasize firm confidence in what was said while light self-irony diminished the emotion of his speech, quite possible and even appropriate, because we talked about the Prague Spring crushed by Soviet tanks and the ideological oppression which multilated the lives of honest and talented people, about interrogations, prisons and exile all that gave birth to the charter.

"What did it all begin with for you?" I asked

"It all began with the van," Jiri Vancura replied with a light smile.

It is said that humour is not simply a feature of the national character. It is also a means of resistance. "The messianic complex is alien to Czechoslovaks," Zdenek Mlynar, a historian, once wrote. "Attacking tanks with brooms is not our idea of heroism. It is not accidental that the image of the brave soldier Švejk, whose irrepressible humour was opposed to the horrible tragedy of war, was born in our country, Czecho-Slovakia."

Scientists, doctors and writers did not attack tanks with brooms in their hands. Nevertheless, many of them had to work as yard-keepers. Others became loaders or watchmen. The authorities tried to break up the intelligentsia, because its views had always been dangerous to them. Jiri Vancura resigned himself. He left the Communist Party and dropped his work as historian and a journalist. His new job was protection of the purity of drinking water. For many years Vancura travelled in a van in search of new sources of drinking water. His van always stood between the vans of the Pitharts, senior and junior. Pithart senior was ambassador to France. Pithart junior today heads the Czech government.

The present foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, was a stoker. After his appointment as foreign minister he continued to work as a stoker for two more days while a man was found to replace him, although he could, of course, leave the furnace. These keepers of water and fire were objectionable to those who pursued the policy of normalization. "I did not regard travelling in a van as a punishmen," Jiri Vancura said with a light irony, "not even in November, 1989, many years before I became a free man. True, my wage was very low, but I had few superiors. And, then, I had plenty of

*Drawing by Igor Smirnov*

time for meditation. Is this punishment?" Years of mediation led many of the persecuted intellectuals to the conclusion that Soviet tanks crushed not only socialism with a human face but also the very utopia. Their views shifted from the ideological to the ethical sphere. Finally, they understood that shrinking into oneself is not a way out. This is how the Charter appeared. At first, it was a document calling for the protection of human rights. After the document was signed by ever more people it turned into a movement without a charter and a framework but solidly united by the principle "ethics above politics."

Attacking tanks with brooms? Paradoxically, by signing the Charter they embarked on the path of political struggle. An article devoted to Chapter-77 in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia says that it is "an attack by enemies of socialism instigated by imperialist circles of the West." Yet we ourselves denied the primacy of politics. But what was paradoxical for some people appeared logical to others. "I am sure that normal and legal positions are the most correct ones in the context of our country," Academician Sakharov said. "What is needed is a systematic defence of human rights, and not political struggle which inevitably instigates people to violence, sectarianism and raging."

In Czeho-Slovakia human rights champions did not fight, as it were. They simply signed one document after another. These documents have been published now. Jiri Vancura took a book from a shelf. He is one of its compilers. the 525-page book consists of documents on the need for a political reform, on guarantees of the freedom to creative work, the condition of national minorities, and the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. Those who signed these documents were interrogated and compelled to emigrate, and some of them died.

In the eyes of ordinary people they were madmen trying to attack tanks with brooms. But not only ordinary people though so. The same view was held by those who liked to talk about the practical effect of any efforts, regarding everything else as struggle against windmills. It was not simply a matter of new forms of protest and signing of new statements. It was the old argument between pragmatists and idealists.

The book opens with an article by Vaclav Havel, one of the first sponsors of the Charter. Jiri Hajek, a former minister of the communist government, was another sponsor. Vaclav Havel writes in his article that they tried to find a man who would be even an antipode to Hajek. The founders of the Charter looked for opponents. They did not regard them as adversaries but stretched out their hands to them. And their gesture did not remain unanswered. The Charter–77 movement was joined by Communists, Euro-Communists, Christians and staunch democrats – people of various political leanings. This set down the principle of tolerance, which was later inscribed in the banners of the November revolution. However, just as in our country, its is still a long way to the victory of tolerance in Czecho-Slovakia.

It seems that so-called abstract humanism has never been favoured anywhere. When one of our eminent writers angrily said that "today the moral attacks the social," I wanted to retort: "Who needs the social if it is without morals, if it is immoral?" But then I quieted myself by the thought that people of this type are disappearing from the political scene. However, recently I read an article by a young progressive in a very progressive magazine, who assailed the Soviet human rights champions of the 1960s for their talk about "intellectual values and morals." He alleged that absolute moral laws do not exist. The following thesis was advanced as an antipode: in a normal democratic society "everyone must simply do his job." Why counterpose one thing to another? Both romantics and realists, pragmatists and idealists should coexist peacefully in a normal democratic society, whereas such notions as conscience, honour, love and truth are eternal.

## A political divorce

Ethics is being replaced by politics again. The Civic Forum movement, which won the elections under the slogan, "Truth and love will prevail over lie and violence," was able to hold in this way for less than one and a half year. And though, as one of my colleagues wrote, it was "a divorce in the Czech way," that is, without family scenes

over the division of property, it was nevertheless a divorce.

"The individual, not the masses, is now in the centre of attention. Everyone is beginning to realize his own interest, and this is quite natural," Jiri Vancura commented on what I said above. "Conflicts between interests, quarrels in society are not natural. There must be some element cementing all people, harmonizing the society itself."

The primacy of universal human values, not ideology, unites and harmonizes the society. However, a party which emerged from the Civic Forum is obviously dominated by an ideology of the "communist-Thatcherist type," as one analyst noted, though a person who joins it is asked whether he was a Communist and when. Vaclav Klaus, who heads this wing of the Civic Forum, does not conceal that it is a rightist party.

I received the following reply to my reasoning:

"If there were no Rights in the society I would regard this circumstance as its defect. The Charter has brought me up so." I wish all others were brought up that way. In real life it happens that the offended become offenders while those who suffered often inflict suffering on others.

"For me a right-winger is not a friend, whereas Klaus thinks that all the reds come from the devil," Jiri Vancura said.

Political pluralism already exists in many countries. But what about the pluralism of consciousness? Ethnic tension is growing. Labels of every kind are pinned on opponents. Newspapers call for a total clearance to check the possible links of citizens with the security bodies. Similar calls were even made at a conference of the Charter movement.

On returning from a visit to his native Prague, a journalist now living in Glasgow wrote: "I am afraid that until people change, the transition of Czecho-Slovakia to a real democracy and a market economy will be extremely complex." Few people in the country understand that idealism and unselfishness are needed under capitalism, too.

The Charter–77 conference was addressed by President Havel, who said that the values of the revolution were breaking up and, therefore, it was necessary to preserve the Charter because "the need for it will become more essential than in the epoch of communism."

It is an alarming confession, though impassive.

"I, too, want the Charter to remain, "Jiri Vancura said. "Society needs a moral-ethical institution standing outside parties and above them. I think that the formerly secret doors of the Charter should today be opened to all."

But how many people will want to join the Charter and how many people admit the primacy of ethics. New politicians often display the same intolerance as party officials. Political interest has become dominant perhaps in all countries of the former socialist camp. There is also a justfication of this state of affairs. "It is becoming to talk about the Temple when there are roads leading to it," I read in one of Soviet newspapers. "Today the image of the Temple is not the prime subject of the thoughts of man. It is not the time for lofty thoughts. We have to cope with daily urgent problems." It seems that many people in Czecho-Slovakia think in this way. Is this a time of pragmatists?

After the death of Academician Sakharov, whose heart broke not only because of political passions but also because of his love for man and humanity, the most precise thoughts about his phenomenon were, in my opinion, expressed by Sergei Averintsev. "For some people his noble image, which seems to have come to us from other times, his even and low voice, which emphasized the incorruptible firmness of what he said, were an embodiment of beauty, the indisputable chartacter of which was more substantial than all particular differences, whereas others said that Sakhalrov was a weak pragmatist," Averintsev pointed out. Noting that Sakharov tried to think in modern categories, Averintsev added: "Nevertheless, his thought was focussed, as people said on olden days, on stationary stars, on eternal, absolute principles." However, Averintsev remarked, it is hardly a good sign that the advocates of totalitarianism refer to principles, whereas liberals refer only to pragmatism.

I think it is a bad sign today; when we obviously push one another towards feuds. All countries "made socialist" seem to need a school of humaneness, a charter of people whose thoughts are focussed on stationary stars, keepers of the purity of springs of human souls, the flames of hearts.

"Do you think that ethics will rise above politics?" I asked Jiri Vancura. "Do you believe that the truth will defeat lies, just as love will defeat violence?"

The conference of Charter–77 did not decide on how the movement will develop in the future. The question remained open.

"You are an altruist..." I said.

"It is a very lofty word," Vancura smiled. "The point is that I and those who think like I are simply a little mad."

No, I thought, leaving his house. Most likely our world is mad. Or perhaps it will always swing between reality and the ideal.

PRAGUE

"A media war," "a massive attack in the press and on television" and suchlike metaphors merit more attention today. They have ceased being metaphors. The instructions to the revolutionaries – seize the telegraph, the telephone system and the printing presses first, and then the bridges – have not been forgotten. The television centres have already been captured. The strategy is the same irrespective of who uses it – the democrats, the military or the old oligarchy.

In the run-up to the referendum on the future of the Union, the media were used as the "strategic heights" from which to "soften up" the public opinion. All this makes one wonder why talk, the words, come first here, and practical action, or deeds, later, why the shooting wars in South Ossetia or Nagorny Karabakh are accompanied by the "media war." And in general, it is rather hard to draw a line of distinction between the real war and its echo.

Nicolaus Copernicus had warned his contemporaries against believing their eyes: contrary to what we see, it is the earth that circles the sun, not the other way round. Nevertheless, we keep saying: "The sun in rising," "the sun is setting" as if we don't know what actually happens. It looks as if we still believe our eyes and, in the sphere of politics, our ears. No sooner said than done! Doesn't this expression imply that whan has to be done ought to be said first?

In the humanities there is the notion of "discoursive practice." It means a certain logic of exposition which regulates human behaviour. Whatever is talked about exists, but whatever fails to fit into the given logic of reasoning does not. **Speaking** articulates a problem and prescribes the form in which it is stated and, consequently, in which it is solved. Simply speaking, this is the standing answer to the question "What is to be done?"

It has long been inculcated in us that deeds are one things, and words are something else again. The former are real, material, tangible, and the latter (words) are just hot air. The political record of the 20th century seems to call this prejudice in question. A real deed is performed already in the word.

The referendum on the future of the Union began a month before the polling day. For a month, the mass media were in the state of war, as they built up the political vocabulary of the referendum. They explained to the voters what their YES or

# Just hot air?

## The word as a political problem

NO votes would mean. To preserve the Union meant to stay alive, to carry on along the road to prosperity, it meant being, in the final analysis. The disintegration of the Union meant – like vivisection or quartering – death, non-being. Well, our sovereign voter, it is up to you to decide between being and non-being. "Isn't this true?" many voters exclaimed. Who said it isn't?

There is ample convincing proof to the contrary, but this proof does not fit into the dominant logic of reasoning – the logic of Power.

The reality of hunger is obvious to anyone – hunger compels you to take certain action. Therefore, why should be deny the reality of the word if it also compels one to action? In politics, the word is action itself.

Why then did millions of TV viewers and radio listeners – our sovereign voters – meekly take in the torrent of words which sealed their future choice in advance? They say that the gas we use in our kitchens has no odour as such and is odorized artificially to make leak detection easy. Our prejudice against "talk" is exactly what makes us vulnerable to politics without knowing it (gas does not smell!). What's more, talk makes politicians out of us, it gives us the illusion that political decisions rest with us. However, our options have already been decided for us, and we are just to obey the rules of game laid down by somebody else. There are no misplays in the language and, consequently, in thoughts.

Perestroika began with words. At first, its authorship was attributed to Lenin who had mentioned the need for it in his last writings. The latter were launched into the political orbit and made a source of radical ideas as regards the reforming of socialism. A clever politician, the initiator of perestroika identified himself with Lenin using the written word. In his last writings, Lenin had put questions and provided the answers to them, therefore arbitrariness was out of the question. The snag was, however, that exactly sixty years before that Lenin's texts had also been moving in the political orbit and had always served as an authoritative source of words. A thorough examination of Stalin's speeches of the collectivization period will reveal the outlines of the same strategy. According to Stalin, the entire policy of collectivization had been outlined by Lenin, as evidenced by numerous quotations and references. What about the "law of the intensification of class struggle"? See Lenin; the need for the liquidation of petty property owners? See Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. so-and-so. The Lenin texts offer the methods of discerning enemies and prescribe appropriate action. The time of Great Liquidations has come: check your watch against Lenin's. But Lenin is no longer with us, therefore we've got to check our actions against his texts. Such texts are flexible: in a certain situation they call for collectivization and "stroika" (construction); in a different situation, they call for de-collectivization and "perestroika." And each time is like the first time, and each time we hear: "There is no option."

Whence such efficacy? Whence such plasticity of reaction to words? The answer lies in one of the greatest achievements of New Power – the 100 percent eradication of illiteracy. The first step of the cultural revolution, teaching the peasants and other "ignorant" sections of the public to read and write served a political purpose which was to discredit all traditional knowledge as inadequate and subject to relegation to oblivion. Under the circumstances, literacy was important not so much as the ability to read and count, as the ability to read a certain kind of texts; the ABC book of the cultural revolution period was "The ABC of Communism." People were taught to read in general and to read political texts at one and the same time. That was part of carrying out the great mission of removing one culture and establishing the different, the "correct" one.



This means that now one's personal experience of running the economy was being replaced by the experience of learning the text which had in it your past, your present, and your future. At the 1925 congress of teachers, Lunacharsky referred to enlightenment as "the third front" (after defence and the industry), the primacy of which was substantiated by the fact that education and enlightenment facilitated the mobilization of human resources to the fighting lines and to the construction sites. Therefore, the People's Commissar of Education said, "we need culture ranging from literacy to science, culture in the field of thought and culture in the field of feelings."

The impression is that culture is supposed to control the masses rather than on the contrary. This view may appear to be one-sided, of course. After all, literacy means progress. In certain situations it is dangerous, nevertheless, although we do not notice that any more than we do other dubious phenomena wearing the mask of progress with a dazzling smile of the radiant future.

It is absurd to put all the blame on progress and enlightenment. Illiteracy only presupposes a different mechanism of power and a different policy. On the other hand, education makes political impact less perceptible, actually invisible, thanks to its penetration into the tissue of human language, and more massive thanks to the modern technical facilities used by the mass media. Therefore we can only note the advent of new forms of politics operating in the sphere of the word and based on the high standards of public education. I make so bold as to say that shooting wars break out in the geographical and political spaces where defeats have been suffered in the sphere of mass media talk.

*Vadim Volkov*

# Big Brother?

*Tatiana Ivanova*

**Some readers are ordinary, some not. The latter display an interest not in literature, politics and journalism, but in the private lives, bents and vices of writers, politicians and journalists.**

My telephone is a quite ordinary one and quite often ordinary readers ring up to say they're calling from Kremenchug or from some far away place to shout: "Thanks! This is Filimonov calling to say thanks for your contribution and *Radio Rossiya* statement. That's all, sorry to have bothered you." I shout back: "Thanks for your appreciation."

We exchange thanks another three times or so, and then hang up.

However, now and again readers out of the ordinary call. When that occurs the voices are quite distinct. One is Pavel Ivanovich, a 100 percent democrat, an erudite, who remembers everything I've ever written, though I myself may have long forgotten some of the things I wrote about. Naturally, when you hear such praise, you chat at length about literature, politics and journalism.

Yet it seems he finds greater interest in what I might have to say about writers, politicians and journalists, even though I'm more of a stay-at-home and hardly know anyone personally. There he says, at the democratic editorial offices I do visit, I must certainly know something or other.

"Is it true that there was a grand row at that editorial office? Is it really true the deputy's fallen out with the chief editor, that the former no longer supports Yeltsin? Heard anything about that? Do you really have no notion that so-and-so, a man we both so deeply respect is a terrible lush? You know he went abroad taking some mementoes along supposedly to hand out as presents, but actually sold them.... Is it true that that editorial office is going to get some electronic equipment from abroad? Know anything about it? Didn't the editor name the Soviet émigreś he met up with in the States? I'd be simply delighted to learn where the editors of the democratic newspapers and magazines get together. Is it really at a co-op café? Or that Russian MPs, I mean those on whom we pin our hopes also go there? Know something? For sure, they must definitely meet systematically somewhere to work out a common platform... Don't want to find anything out? After all, we could go along there together and tell those democrats not to quarrel among themselves. Otherwise we'll lose the battle for democracy!"

I'm certainly not an interesting person with whom to discuss such things! "Sorry," I say, "I simply have no time, Pavel Ivanovich."

However, when I'm away Pavel Ivanovich is delighted to chat with the family. I really can't unterstand whether all the nonsense the family might tell him really mean anything to Pavel Ivanovich. However, one evening mother tells me: "Pavel Ivanovich says you look worn out." When he phones, I ask: "Where did you see me?" He retorts immediately: "At a get-together with your readership." "Why didn't you come up to me?" Again he replies without a moment's hesitation. I say: "Pavel Ivanovich, all your interest in me has to do exclusively with your place of work."

He takes offense and pretends to be angry. How could I think such a thing? But what, could I really think? Anyhow he stops calling.

Soon afterwards there's another distinct voice in the receiver. Now it's a certain Seryozha. Oh, my every word is a real diamond, while my every article is a journalistic masterpiece! Oh, he's been reading my contributions for years now, he gasps. He enthuses about the same books I do, respects the same people I do. But incidentally, he goes on, at that wonderful editorial office which so often features my contributions there was a row, they say? How regrettable that the democrats quarrel among themselves! It's said they congregate at some co-op café, all the editors of democratic publications, to draft a common policy. Don't I know where exactly? Oh, if I could only consent to meet Seryozha and autograph a book for him.

Come along, I say, thinking to myself that I'll at least be able to look him in the eye.

A very presentable young man, sensitive, shy. Some five minutes afterwards he confides to me dark secrets that "I don't even tell mother about."

Really, had I such secrets to confide, I would entrust them to Seryozha, at least out of gratitude for his artistry. But I don't have any. Nevertheless, my telephone conversations with Seryozha assume a definite regularity. Then one day, fed up with the job of dodging the same old list of questions, I intimate that to Seryozha. However the brainy chap he is, totally unlike Pavel Ivanovich, he does not take offence, pretends to misunderstand my purpose, but never-theless announces that he's going away on a business trip of quite some duration.

Soon after I get a long-distance call. Only twenty years old, my new acquaintance begs me to help him understand literature, journalism and the democratic movement. Then: "Is it true that at that wonderful editorial office, the hope of the democratic movement, the deputy has fallen out with the chief editor and no longer supports Yeltsin? Is it true that they've been promised electronic equipment from the States?" Half an hour passes, there's a click, then another half an hour, and again a click, to change the tape. "Sasha", I say, "one can make a long-distance call of such length only if state's paying for it."

That call occurred on the very same day, when at the USSR Supreme Soviet session KGB chief Kryuchkov explained what an arduous job the KGB's voluntary helpers have to do and urged all to sympathize with them. He, of course, was uttering God's truth. I have every sympathy for these nice guys. True, most likely I would comprehend their interest better were I, for instance, to have bought a rifle with optic sights, or to have met a CIA agent in some secret place or to be going around some military plant with a micro-camera. The thing is that I go around democratic editorial offices in broad daylight. So is it for that, to extract from me sundry stuff and nonsense, gossip about these editorial offices and their staffs that they deduct our few miserable rubles from us, taxpayers? And adopt in its first reading a bill to have that sort of thing continue? Does that mean that that is how the safety of our state will continue to be ensured? By these self-same, if I'm not mistaken, methods?

# The whitest congressman

**Rep. David Duke (Louisiana) is a civilized racist and anti-Semite making a brilliant career under law-governed democracy. He knows the rules of the game**

*Lev Yelin,*
our special correspondent

David Duke is tall, athletic and extremely handsome. His dark moustache which contrasts with a mane of fair hair and almond-shaped eyes have had a magic influence on the female portion of the electorate (after the election to Congress, however, Duke shaved his moustache).

When I met David Duke in the summer of 1989 at his headquarters, he spoke gracefully and intelligently, making occasional references to Hegel, Kant, Heidegger, Voltaire and Nietzsche, and recalling trips to Indochina, India, Japan and Israel. His suit betrayed just the right proportion of expensiveness and elegance to be for its wearer a status symbol without automatically identifying him with the career-hungry yuppie class. It was difficult to imagine that only a decade ago David Duke preferred a white KKK hood to expensive suits.

Ten years ago David Duke was the leader of the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a KKK group he founded himself.

An ex-Klansman-turned-Congressman – even if in only one of the fifty states of the USA? If the KKK membership and the whitehood were only the sins of Duke's young age, the only thing to discuss would be the limits of what a US politician is allowed to have done in the past. Most Duke biographers agree, however, that the man remains loyal to his ideals and sincerely hopes that his political career will allow him to take concrete decisions and alter the laws in the direction he desires.

How could Duke have made his career in a society where one nationalistic remark may cost a mayor his office and where dozens of public and government organizations safeguard the rights of ethnic and racial minorities?

## The imperial wizard

The son of a veteran of World War Two, David Duke joined the KKK at the age of 17. As a student at Louisiana State University, he formed the neo-Nazi White Youth Alliance. One document of that time is a photo which captured Duke wearing a swastika and holding a poster calling the lawyer of the Chicago Seven "a communsit kike" (today Duke calls this "an youthful prank").

Unlike most fellow students, Duke sought Army service in Vietnam but the US Army, which fought Communism, refused to allow a white supremacist radical in its ranks. Then Duke headed for Laos as a teacher of English. A remarkable episode happened to the young Klansman in Vientiane. While driving to school one morning, he hit the rear end of a Soviet diplomat's car. The car belonged to a Soviet military attache, but the collision did not develop into a personal conflict between the representatives of superpowers confronting each other in Indochina. The Russian was just as much a racist as Duke was and was extremely concerned about racial minorities in the Soviet Union, writes Michael Zatarain in his book *Evolution of a Klansman*.

In 1975 Duke quit the White Youth Alliance and devoted himself wholly to the KKK, rapidly climbing the Klan career ladder. It is generally believed that career opportunities in such underground organizations as the KKK (where the titles sound more impressive than in the civil service or even in the military: The Imperial Wizard, The Knight of the White Camelia, The Grand Dragon) are often a form of compensation to those who are less successful in conventional occupations. However, Duke's ambitions stretched even farther: he formed and headed the Christian Knights of the KKK, was titled Grand Wizard and in 1975 he ran for a seat in the Louisiana senate. The 1975 campaign, as well as another attempt in 1979, was a fiasco.

David Duke was one of those KKK leaders who sought to polish the Klan's public image and make it a political force. He travelled across the US and spoke on radio and television. He never avoided public debates, during which he somehow diluted his racist views, which helped him to score more points in his favour. The KKK, Duke explained, was not the lynchings and cross-burnings in the dark of the night, the KKK was a community of people loyal to good old America...

At the end of 1989 Duke told me.

"Twenty years ago I could easily picture a typical Californian girl: blue eyes, long blonde hair... Today's image would be different: a brunette with high cheekbones and olive-coloured eyes. I am not saying this is bad, but we do have the right to preserve our America, the America of fair freckled Tom Sawyer!"

## Freedom of speech – for a racist too

By the end of the 1970, the strength of the KKK rose from 6,500 (1975) to over 10,000, in large part thanks to Duke's efforts. In addition some 75,000 people subscribed to KKK literature and attended meetings, still fearing though that a KKK membership card could damage their public image.

Duke tried hard to dispell these fears and during televized debates he easily defeated the straightforward advocates of racial equality who

were unprepared to face intellectual resistance from a Klansman.

Better than many Duke understands the rules of the game an open chauvinist must abide by in a democracy. At the beginning of the 1970s when the university council barred the White Youth Alliance from staging meetings on the university campus, David Duke appealed to the American Civil Liberties Union, a non-governmental human rights organization with several decades of experience in defending the rights of minorities and dissidents. The appeal sparked heated debates within the ACLU and the ACLU Board of directors was split: some directors insisted that the rights of neo-Nazis were to be protected, others refused to agree. Eventually, the law prevailed, the ACLU brought a suit against Louisiana State University and David Duke taught a lesson on "Freedom of speech in the United States" to the unversity authorities.

After it opted to defend the rights of neo-Nazis, the ACLU lost many of its sponsors, as I was frankly told at the ACLU's Washington headquarters, but the principle prevailed: if one group is denied constitutional rights, the rights of the rest of society may be endangered. Meanwhile, David Duke continued to work out a political line that could attract hundreds of thousands without compromising them and guarantee Duke himself a good political career with no legal complications.

To his closest lieutenants the new leader Duke remained a die-hard Klansman. A Nashville-based reporter, Jerry Tompson, who spent 18 months disguised as a devoted Klansman, quoted Duke's speech at one closed KKK meeting. Duke referred to black children "nigger bastards" and – oh, what ingratitude – insisted that America's human rights movement was a part of the "dirty kikes' conspiracy."

In 1980 Duke addressed the Klansmen with a letter entitled "To the Dear Patriot," in which he explained that the Holocaust, the Nazi butchering of Jews, was no more than "a historical hoax perpetrated on Christians by Jews in order to produce a guilty complex in the former. This was one of the last outbursts of sincerity in a man who was rapidly mastering the art of political deception. In 1988 Duke already spoke of "some doubts" as to the adequacy of the information on the Holocaust. After he won the 1989 elections, an elderly woman approached Duke and showed a Nazi concentration camp number burnt in the flesh of her hand. "Do you mean all this is a myth?" she asked. "I've never said that," mumbled Duke and went away.

David Duke picked up other topics that inspired weaker emotional resistance and were general enough not to entail trials. Duke could not have failed to consider the experience of his patron Willis Carto, the Founder of the Liberty Lobby. Once Carto offered $50,000 to anyone who could prove the existence of Nazi death camps. An American who had been in one such camp challenged Carto and the latter had to pay as much $ 90,000.

Today David Duke confines himself to lengthy reflections on the tremendous political, economic and social influence of the Zionist lobby in America.

"They own the press," he told me in 1989. "The largest newspaper of New Orleans, *The Times Picayune*, belongs to a Jewish family and has published 13 articles against me!"




*Drawing from The Washington Post*

Although he is not familiar with the vocabulary of Soviet anti-Semites, who prefer to style themselves after anti-Zionists, Duke says:

"I am not opposed to Jews in general, after all Jews are Eurasians too, but there are Zionists among them!"

## $35,000 for the Christian Knights

In 1980 when his "letter to the patriot" appeared Duke had to leave the KKK. He must have thought of leaving anyway after the electoral defeats of 1975 and 1979, but eventually his withdrawal from the KKK was accompanied by a scandal.

Jerry Tompson told me that Duke offered Bill Willkinson, the head of a rival KKK group, to sell the list of the Christian Knights for $35,000. Willkinson, who was also a double agent for the FBI, tripped Duke up by having the moment of the actual transaction videotaped and shown on TV. Duke declined all accusations, but three days later he left his KKK position. After that he organized in his home state of Louisiana a National Association for the Advancement of White People, which he proclaimed a human rights organization.

The wording of his slogans was becoming more and more refined. Instead of "equal rights for Whites," Duke started calling for "equal rights for all and no privileges to some," thus opposing the government affirmative action programmes. Duke regarded almost all civil rights law adopted as a result of the 1960s human rights campaign as privileges granted to individual minorities.

David Duke has the answer to those who believe that the affirmative action policy is a necessary compensation for the past injustices:

> "The chances that the ancestors of an individual White American were slave owners or oppressed the blacks are minimal. More than 90 percent of white Americans can declare that neither they nor even their distant ancestors had ever done any harm to the blacks..."

In 1980 the newspaper of the NAAWP, headed by David Duke suggested that all the blacks be resettled to the Mississippi mouth area and the area itself be called New Africa, in 1984 that same newspaper thus described the political creed of Louisiana's would-be representative:

> "Since society is still inclined to regard the concept of white supremacism as immoral, activists of the white supremacist movement should not directly speak about racial superiority or lower races. Instead, refer to racial differences and avoid giving direct assessments..."

Five years later, Duke thus answered one of my questions:

"I do not insist that the whites are generally better than blacks, but whites are obviously better in such field as mathematics and cybernetics, for isntance. The blacks have an inborn superiority, for instance in their bone and muscle structure, they make better basketball players and short-distance runners. They are better jazz players, but Handel's Mass would be better performed by a white..."

## Duke chooses among parties

In 1988 Duke ran for presidency representing the Democratic Party, but then defected to the ultra-right Populist Party. Duke's call "preserve our heritage" attracted 44,000 votes, but the campaign was doomed to failure.

In January 1989, Duke plunged into the

A KKK meeting in Georgia: testing the limits of freedom of speech

*Photo by the author*

campaign for a vacant seat in the State Legislature of Louisiana. This time he associated himself with the Republican Party and the US Establishment was for the first time forced to think how to react to the Duke phenomenon. Eventually, the Republican Party thought Duke too odious a figure to represent it and both Reagan and Bush publicly supported Duke's opponent.

"Even the archbishop of Louisiana spoke up against me!" said Duke who is now making the most of his popular-hero-persecuted-by-the-establishment image. Duke believes the Zionist lobby is behind what he calls "a massive attack against him."

Strangely, however, the critical voices from Washington did not foil the ex-Klansman's victory.

Duke ran in a 99 percent white neighbourhood of New Orleans and proved an excellent campaigner. Speaking in Louisiana, then in its sixth year of economic depression, Duke called for cuts in state social programmes for the low-income families (which meant mostly blacks families), advocated a struggle against illegitimate births (which mostly affected black women) and spoke for abolition of employment quotas for minorities (blacks constitute one third of the population of New Orleans).

Duke used expertly parliamentary formulas, while receptive supporters were only too willing to decipher the hidden message. When he discussed problems touched upon by all politicians, Duke went farther than anyone, because he offered concrete solutions, albeit of a negative character: bans, cuts and refusals. He was indignant when someone mentioned his KKK past calling this a personal attack, but he never condemned the KKK thus securing his old friends' support.

In principle, Duke extensively used KKK recruitment methods in his campaign. The Klan was always there when a factory or a plant was closed down and called on the locked-out workers to join the KKK so as "to get back jobs the blacks seized." Simply put, Duke arranged these methods into an original policy.

Local politicians did not risk standing up against Duke for they feared they might lose some of their own supporters. Liberal journalists were divided over whether to cover Duke's campaign or not, fearing that extensive coverage might be free advertisement for the ex-Klansman. As a result, most voters had only a very general idea of the candidate's past.

On January 16, Martin Luther King's birthday, fate gave an unexpected gift to David Duke: in New Orleans several whites were beaten up by black demonstrators.

David Duke was elected Congressman.

## A Congressman, but not a Senator. Will Duke be Governor?

The ex-Klansman's transformation into a respectable politician was almost painless. Attempts to boycott him made by too scrupulous fellow Congressmen and whispers behind his back were bound to cease some time, and they did stop. In a mysterious manner the dark past shields Duke from new scandals and revelations. When it turned out that Rep. David Duke attended the congress of the Populist Party in Chicago and shook the hand of Art Jones, the vice president of the American Nazi Party, Duke simply said he did not know whom he had greeted.

Although Duke has not managed to abolish the minority quota system in Louisiana, he is giving more and more grounds to speak about "fruitful cooperation" with colleagues in the Republican Party. In the autumn of 1990 the pragmatists who wanted to use "Duke's strong points" (in fact, high-placed pragmatists are almost always to be found behind the rises and falls of political figures like Duke) got a cold shower when Duke ran for the vacant seat of the Senator from Louisiana and easily overstripped the official candidate of the Republican Party. The 40 percent of votes he won was not enough to take over the seat in the Senate, but it became clear that in the not-so-prosperous Lousiana, the number of proponents of social justice in Duke's interpretation was growing quickly.

Now Duke is campaigning to be elected Governor of his home state. So far he has occupied a modest third place, but the growing attendance at his election rallies causes serious concern among experts. It is believed though that Duke needs a crisis to win, something like the Martin Luther King birthday riots, but stronger. Duke is a politician for troubled times and America is still too stable and prosperous for him to succeed.

***

In one interview Duke said he was sure politicians like him would soon appear not only in Louisiana, but all over the South and across the country. He may be right. Moreover, it seems to me that Duke the politician is a truly international figure.

This racist, fascist and anti-Semite can make a political career in a democracy as well – after all he too has the right to elect and be elected. To oppose such figures with anything but the spoken word would mean to violate the law and undermine the pillars of democracy. However, in their turn, such people must bow to the restrictions imposed by a democracy, the slogans which were voiced in Munich beerhouses in the 1930s or at KKK Rallies will have to be forgotten, once the advocates of such slogans leave their homes and go public.

The state and the law must set limits on what a politician can afford and what automatically excludes a politician from political life. If a racist, fascist and anti-Semite can be upwardly mobile without having to hide his real face (as Duke has to do in America today), this means that the state is seriously ill and in for bad trouble.

NEW ORLEANS – MOSCOW

# The World Paper

*How people eat, drink or play often defines cultures as much as linguistic or ethnic differences. The following pages take a whimsical look at the different cultures of drinking in Europe, the unmarked borders in Asia defined by 'chopstick rice' and 'hand rice' and the strange anthropology of baseball and soccer in Latin America*

## The Architecture of drinking

A MIDGEN OF truth dwells in the old proverb: "Wine is the drink of the gods." Happy people drink wine. In any case, they are less unhappy than those who drink vodka. Wine is drunk to liven up life; to stick colorful feathers into one's hair; to unwind the psychological carousel; to make the stomach happy and to make the waiter laugh when ordering Nuits St. Georges '57, which is a terrible year for that wine. In any event, those who enjoy life drink wine. Those who want to lose consciousness drink vodka.

I have the impression that the "geography of drinking" has more to do with history and with psychology than with actual geography and climate. Let's first consider drinking among the English.

The ENGLISH drink everything, but only at specific times and specific places. Beer is drunk in pubs the whole day through, with the exclusion of noon. Until recently, English pubs were divided into classes, like trains. Especially picturesque pubs were found at the docks. In the basement sat the mob singing revolutionary songs which they found amusing. They treated such a night out as a type of concert. The tradition of drinking beer in England is extremely old and is taken very seriously. Consider the existence of the society called "The British Guild of Beer Writers."

In England, one drinks whiskey at home by the hearth, often alone and in slippers. Whiskey time is after 6 p.m.

The tradition of drinking wine on the British Isle is a warrior-knight tradition. Wine-drinking toasts originated in the Middle Ages. Stories about English feasts and revelers are somewhat surrealistic. For example, the following was related to me by Polish-Englishman and scholar Leszek Kolakowski.

In 1968 he was ousted from the University of Warsaw and landed at All Souls College in Oxford. The customs there were new to him. One day he was obliged to don a toga and make his way to a certain particularly festive dinner.

It is not surprising that after mastering all of these procedures, with great hardship, he had no desire for conversation or for other tiring social activities. He ate in silence and paid no attention to the elderly lady sitting next to him. The lady did what she could. "Isn't it strange that according to the English the turkey comes from Turkey, but according to the French it comes from India," said the woman. "Indeed," barked the professor and that was how the conversation ended. After dinner he was besieged by questions: "What is she like? What did you talk about?" It turned out that he had been sitting next of Agatha Cristie. She was the wife of a British archaeologist who was a member of All Souls. If this charming adventure had taken place after vodka, it would have had a totally different result, one far more chaotic – which no one would have remembered.

In FRANCE, hard liquor constitutes only 15.4 percent of total alcoholic beverages consumed; such a small percentage would seem to warrant praise. The French, however, do drink large quantities of wine. Wine drinking is something of a liturgy, a daily responsibility.

The French begin drinking wine at age seven or eight and happily continue to life's end. During that span, most French acquire a list of hundreds of different types of wines which they can discuss as an epicure or a poet.

Luckily, however, they are protected from softening of the brain and bursting of the liver by the fact that food often accompanies drink. Even the most nonchalant vagabond who sleeps by the banks of the Seine has sprawled in front of him a piece of cheese on yesterday's paper beside his vin rouge.

Until recently, only two social groups in France drank stronger drinks than wine: painters and fishermen. Absinthe filled the impressionists' palettes with blurred insanity Pastisse allowed fishermen of forgot the boredom of high tide for a while.

It would seem that drinking to accompany a hearty meal of pasta would be like any other type of drinking. This, however, is not the case. In ITALY, drinking and daily life are permeated by idle chatter as in no other culture. How many words will the average Italian mother utter – or rather, let fly – trying to drag her ornery child from the bathtub? How many words does it take an enraged Sicilian to scream before his friend finally shoots him?

A more fortunate combination of wine and sun takes on a friendlier character where it is closer to the gods, as in GREECE. Here, there is none of the characteristic tension between American tourists and natives. Usually, the uptight American tries to force himself to relax, while the relaxed native tries to force himself to work.

SWEDES drink first and foremost because alcohol is expensive. Somewhere, at some juncture, one must take risks! In addition to this, the Swedes drink out of fear of an easy life. They are afraid that their lives will pass them by without record. So they drink the illusion of action.

It is no accident that people call the FINNS the Russians of the North. However, if one were to take a close look at Finnish drinking habits, then it would become apparent that a good deal of their habits stem from a fear of Russia, non an affinity for it. The War of 1917 and their short but horrible Soviet occupation of Finland was extraordinarily traumatic for the apathetic and hardworking Finns. From these events came ghastly experiences which have been conveyed from generation to generation and which have become the personal legacy of every Finn.

The Finns drink somberly and alone. Sometimes, in order to drink cheaply and with great concentration, they board ferries which sail around the Baltic and remain on board at ports of call. On these ferries they take advantage of the duty-free zones, which usually includes the bar.

POLES drink vodka. They often mix it with poor quality grapefruit juice, calling the mixture "soup." The average Pole annually consumes 6.8 liters of alcohol, which puts the Poles at the bottom of the list in Europe in this respect. Nonetheless, when a Pole does drink, it's usually hard liquor alone. Two-thirds of all alcoholic beverages consumed in Poland are pure grain alcohol. The Pole sometimes remembers that it is worthwhile to freeze vodka, and sometimes, for want of a refrigerator or lack of time, he drinks it warm, usually at home or on a park bench...or in the coatroom...or atop a bulldozer.

There are two types of Polish drinking: that which literature conveys and that which real life conveys. Literature, especially the prewar literature, portrays Polish drinking as charming, fantastic clowning. If one glances through the memoirs of the Polish bohemians, one can reach the conclusion that play and adventure are impossible without alcohol.

Julian Tuwim, a universally beloved and widely read poet, author of *The Drunkard's Dictionary*, among other works, once wrote: "It is not worth to love, not worth to long, to wait! Only one thing is worth doing, to get drunk!"

Essentially, Polish drinking is somber and extraordinarily tiring. In the 1980s, the Polish authorities tried to introduce partial prohibition by restricting the sale of alcohol before 1 p.m. This fight, however, is not effective. The cynicism and apathy borne by years of communism as well as a somber historical memory, provide favorable circumstance for drinking. The Russian tsars of the 19th century forced the nations they conquered to drink. They introduced mandatory deliveries to the peasants and they built taverns so that the people would forget about rebellion and, with time, even about themselves.

Beer drinkers are a distinct breed of people. Some treat the drinking of beer as an indispensable element for respecting tradition. Martin Luther has been memorialized in paintings with a mug of beer in his hand. Of course, the GERMANS drink beer the most stylishly of all. They carve complicated patterns in their foam, drain the mug at one chug, pee in nice WCs with green hearts, then go to drink vodka. The drinking of hard liquors in Germany accounts for 22 percent of all consumed alcoholic beverages, in Czechoslovakia it is 32 percent.

Beer, taken in large quantities, is a sleep-inducing agent and it is not know why in Polish folk poetry hops is held as a symbol of male potency. Nonetheless, after drinking beer Germans sing and dance. How is this possible? Goethe made an an unforgetable observation about the Germans: "The famed Germanic discipline is in reality nothing other than an attempt to overcome deep-seated internal chaos."

If this is the case, then it is but a single step to alcohol. The conflict between discipline and chaos is a serious conflict indeed. One must experience an unbearable tension in which these two driving currents flow! On a Sunday afternoon between widely spaced tables or even on the grass, the Bavarian peasants dance. But what dance it is! Smooth, sad and lethargic. Heavy wooden shoes move along with sleepy dignity.

RUSSIAN drinking, well, really Soviet drinking, is drinking to the death. When life becomes too horrible, death seems to be a more bearable alternative. Drinking has always been a significant part of Soviet culture because of climate, wars and boredom. Vodka drinking acquired new dimensions under the Soviet economic system, which offered little hope. Vodka became the only escape and consolation.

What does the world know about Soviet drinking? Not much. Our lack of imagination gets in the way. How can one imagine someone who tries to eat the leaves off the trees in a Siberian GULAG? Someone who shares his cell with 20 other foul-smelling men packed in like sardines? Someone who has been denounced by his own son, brother, father? How can one imagine a life which has today led herds of crazed women to storm empty liquor stores? Who will understand and diagnose Mandelstam's crazy impulses, he who wandered in poverty, persecuted for one poem?

Even if one can imagine someone else's life, it is still difficult to imagine that of Vladimir Wysocki, Russia's greatest contemporary bard, author of thousands of songs full of rage. The man who recreated the role of Hamlet in the famous theatre on the Taganka was humiliated by nobodies and party activists with furrowed brows à la Brezhnev.

And so, a less romantic reader would say, "So, artists drink!" But so do the peasants. A tale spread throughout the farms that a great change was coming. The new authorities would be distributing land, or rather they would begiving land back, for keeps. But what is really happening? People don't want to take land! They prefer to lie on a bench in the tumbledown shack, half-dozing, half-vegetating and half-not existing, lethargically sipping moonshine. This generation just won't mount a tractor.

*Aghnieszka Osiecka*
WARSAW, POLAND

# Living hand to mouth, or by chopsticks

When the border war between India and China was brewing I asked Krishna Menon, the Indian Defense Minister, where India ended. As though brushing off a fly, he replied: "Where the chopsticks begin."

That was not just an irritable wisecrack. It was an epigrammatic explanation of the entire dispute between the two Asian giants. Underneath the political wrangling over some remote and arid morsels of mountainous real estate, quite useless to the people of either country, were the cultural differences which separated them. Chopsticks are the cultural artifacts which distinguish the Chinese and Southeast Asians who use them from the South Asians who eat rice with their fingers. They are symbols that point to the habitual differences in their modes of thought and in the way they perceive the world.

The expression of this difference is most clearly seen in their scripts. South Asians, like Europeans think in words. East Asians think in pictures. And a succession of pictures does not observe the grammar of words or a linear logic of discrete facts.

That is why Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai, who seemed to get on like twin souls when they appeared in public, smiled bleakly when their followers chanted "Hindi-Cheeni bhai-bhai" (They could make nothing of one another during their private conversations, which were classic instances of non-meetings of the minds.

Is there no such thing, then, as an Asian Mind? Having reported on Asia for more than 30 years, from Suez to Tokyo and from Lahore to Jogjakarta, digging into the minds of politicians, journalists, artists, sages and charlatans, my answer to that question has shifted from a loud "No" to a soft "maybe."

The myths and legends, trival and profound, are similar. The legends relating to the birth of Jesus and Buddha and to the precocious behaviour of the two infants and the exquisitely chaste nature of their mums are much the same. Remember, incidentally, that all the founders of the great religions were born east of Suez despite the common Western tendency to depict Christ as a blue-eyed blond. The heroes and symbols, sacred and profane, are shared by most Asians.

Observing the universality of such deep-seated believes in peoples' behavior patterns impelled me to recognize that there may well be such a thing as an Asian Mind which underlies the relatively shallow differnces in the way we eat our rice, the clothes we wear and the political views we hold. It is these differences which give variety and color to the myriad societies of Asia. Even within countries such variety is evident. The South Indian male sports of lungi, an ankle-length skirt or hemmed cloth worn around the waist, while in North India, the dhoti cloth is kitched up between the legs and tucked into the back waist, natural air-conditioning during the hot summers. Most Sri Lankan women wear saris. And some of the Colombo ladies will push their waist down and their blouses up to offer a six-inch wide naval display.

The sarong-kabaya – skirt and jacket – worn by most Malay women is not shaped by a design artrist to fit a body into, but takes the shape of a body, whatever that is. In the real Malay world the woman maketh the clothes, not clothes maketh the woman.

Whatever the reason for these differences, and however deep the Asian Mind drives its roots, I praise Allah, Krishna, Jehovah and Brahma for the cultural diversity they have vouchsafed for us. And long may they preserve it from the great polluters: the advertising agencies of McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pepsi Cola.

*Tarzie Vittachi*
COLOMBO, SRI LANKA

# What game did Huemac play?

AMONG THE PRE-COLUMBIAN stone statues in San Agustin, in central Colombia, there is a curious figure that attracts the attention of archaeologists. It is an Augustinian Indian kneeling, with a club held firmly in both hands resting on his shoulder. Behind him stands another expectant figures.

More than 4,000 kilometers away, in the heart of Mexico, the Aztec Indian culture flourished. A famous Aztec myth known as the "Five Suns" tells the story of the god Huemac, who lost a ball game to the earth and rain gods.

The San Agustin monolith has inspired some historians to believe that the Agustinian Indians played something similar to baseball 1,500 years ago. And some anthropologists believe that Huemac's game against the gods – of which we know only that Huemac lost the game, though no one knows the score – was a primitive form of soccer.

In fact, few cultures on the planet have failed to develop some sort of game aided by precarious instruments such as stones, blown-up bladders, sticks, hoops made with flexible branches and other implements. With the exception of a few countries (such as Spain, whose bulls appear in the Altamira cave drawings made 27,000 years ago) the popularity of their favorite sports is the result historic circumstances and not of Paleolithic or Neolithic events.

In almost all of South America, socer is more than a sport: It is almost a religion. South American teams have conquered the coveted World Cup seven times.

Soccer is a passion in almost all of Latin America. Rich and poor share the fascination awakened by the brilliance of Pelé and Maradona. Women play very little, but often grace stadiums. Men play, pay to watch and readily fight to defend the honor of their teams.

The areas with the best soccer have been the Southern Cone of South America – a result of the early influence of industrial development in the Rio de la Plata region – and some Brazilian cities. Soccer surfaced there at the end of the past century when British workers arrived to build railroads and heavy industrial factories.

Baseball became a powerful force in the Caribbean, a region nearer to American historic and cultural influence.

Mexico, a country that enjoys soccer to the extent that it is the only nation to have hosted the World Cup twice, spreads its affection among several sports. One of them is baseball, a sport that two decades ago produced the famous junior league team known as the "Marvelous Chamacos," a team that became a David to the American Goliaths.

Nevertheless, geographic proximity to the US does not always determine baseball's popularity. Soccer fever caused a brief war in Central America in 1969 when the Honduran and Salvadoran armies faced off against one another. In contrast, the hottest conflicts in Central American baseball have been resolved without bloodletting in stadiums.

International influence is not the only factor that contributes to the popularity of certain sports in Latin America. Geography and national culture also are influential. It is not surprising that Colombian cyclists, raised high in the Andean mountains, are the best upholl racers in the world.

In other countries, such as Panama, the nationale pride is boxing. But this is for the simple and compelling reason that the country has produced several world champions. This triumphant image attracts young boys from poor neighborhoods with dreams of glory. Early in Latin America's boxing history, amateur boxing was an elite sport practiced in good schools. As soon as it acquired economic significance, it became a vehicle, often brutal, for those to whom society denies other channels.

Sometimes traditional sciences, such as archaeology, sociology or geography, cannot explain the popularity of certain sports. Consider the inexplicable popularity of jai alai, a Basque ball game played in Miami, where most Hispanic fans are not from the French or Spanish Basque country but from Cuba or Latin America. Perhaps love of gambling has something to do with it.

In light of all this, it should be no surprise when the strange ball game played by brave Huemac against the gods of the earth and rain someday sweeps Czechoslovakia or Thailand. But first it would be nice to find out what the game was all about.

*Daniel Samper*
MADRID, SAMPER

# The Soviets have an appetite for good ideas



You're looking at one of Moscow's newest foods, the Vege Burger. This specialty of Cafe Vege Burger in Komsomol Square was developed by the Archer Daniels Midland Company. Low in fat, low in calories, free of cholesterol and containing dietary fiber, the Vege Burger has enjoyed an enthusiastic reception in the Moscow market.

We're proud of the success of the Vege Burger. Not just because of its popularity, but because it demonstrates once again why today, ADM is the world's most innovative source of processed agricultural products.

ADM

SUPERMARKET TO THE WORLD

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

"Defection: this word from the vocabulary of power means the line of behaviour which, under definite circumstances, is the only responsible one from the moral standpoint," Max Frisch told his audience in a speech he made in honour of the fine German writer Alfred Andersch, the author of the book *Cherries of Freedom*, a fragment of which we submit to our readers here. Until quite recently, this autobiographical essay stood not the slightest chance of finding its way to the pages of any Soviet periodical. It was written by a man who had committed the act of defection twice.

In the summer of 1944, Alfred Andersch, a Wehrmacht soldier, threw his carbine away and gave himself up to the advancing American troops. Later, in his Cherries of Freedom, he told the story behind that turning-point in his life.

It took no mean courage and total freedom from convention to publish a book which justified defection traditionally regarded as treachery and disgrace.

For Andersch, defection was a move prompted not by ulterior motives, not by hopes for more comfortable living, but by the sense of profound responsibility, by the wish to be at peace with his conscience which demanded a break with any oppressive state or political regime. Refusal to be a "cog" in the machine of oppression is on his way to finding goes a long way towards a life which is worth living.

Andersch linked the crucial decision he made in 1944 with another, much earlier, turning-point in his life when he, a young man of 19, a leader of the Bavarian Young Communist League, broke with the Communist Party in 1933. He could not put up with the passiveness of German Communists. He was convinced that they had to offer Nazism fierce armed resistance. "We were victims of determinist philosophy which denied freedom of will," he wrote. Fettered by theoretical dogmas and Party "discipline", the Communists conducted scholastic discussions at the decisive moment when Nazism was taking over power.

Since then on, he always remained skeptical and suspicious of blind submission to any ideological doctrine. His bitter disappointment with the Party, which had turned into a party of bureaucrats, with the cult of the leader and with fascist-like methods of struggle yielded, in the intensity of feeling, only to his aversion for Nazism and for the "sewer rat," Hitler.

Andersch was by no means alone in denouncing totalitarian structures – many other European intellectuals had recovered quite early in life from their juvenile infatuation with Leftwing Radical ideas (Marxist ones included). "Don't let them seduce you", "leave your options open" – such are the principles adhered to by Andersch's characters – people who refuse to have anything to do with revolutionary Messianism or any other forms of suppressing the individual.

*The fragment prepared for publication by Irina Mlechina, D.Sc.(Philology)*

# Cherries of freedom

*Alfred Andersch (1914–1980)*

Although my surrender was supposed to be unconditional, I didn't want it to be that way. I was going to give myself up of my own free will and therefore wished to reserve the right to do so on certain conditions. (I mean, of course, not the condition that I should be treated better than the other POWs, but political conditions for the post-war period). I decided to defect to the other side because I wanted to effect an act of freedom. I wanted to do that on a no man's land between the captivity I was escaping from and the captivity I was volunteering for. I wanted to defect to the other side in order to regain the right to make conditions, the right I had won in the past; I wanted to restore this right, a right that I had all but lost over the years. I wanted to defect: after all, it would be absurd to fire even a single shot at the enemy who could never be an enemy to me. In general, there was no trench for me from which I could shoot. Besides that, I wanted to defect because I was afraid of being shot at and of being killed, whether senselessly or not senselessly.

I could tell you now that I was extremely brave because I opted for a much graver danger perhaps than that of falling in action – the danger of being caught in the act of defecting by military police and executed on the spot. In this way I could present the episode as a little heroic story which would have only the trifling defect of being untrue. As I was pondering my plan of escape, I took the danger of being caught into consideration. In the process of preparation for this act, the thought of the military police never, for as much as a second, took on the form of fear. The aim I had set myself filled me with courage which had never given way to fear. I am at my most honest when I say that in the face of the risk I was going to take, my mood was that of enormous light-heartedness...

But then, as already mentioned, the very thought of entering the absurd bloody war zone aroused in me the kind of instinctive disgust known as fear. This is not to say that I was gripped with panic. Most defections, especially the planned mass defections by, say, Italian soldiers in Africa, came not out of fear of death, but out of the will to live. In the same way as most suicides are committed not out of fear of life but out of the will to die. What I mean is that one can take his own life only if he is overcome with an irrepressible love of death. Those who go into a life-and-death battle should be prepared to die because they cannot reckon on staying alive; they are potential suicides (I am not speaking of the beastlike kind of fighters who go all out to win,

i.e., to kill the enemy; those are potential killers). The preparedness to look death directly in the eyes constitutes the honour of a warrior, as Schiller aptly put it... Now the honour of a defector lies in being prepared to turn away from the face of death, from the head of Gorgon who turns the beholder into stone rather than stirring him to action.

An overwhelming sense of danger crept over me only once in my life, in autumn, 1933, in a cell of the Gestapo jail in Munich after they arrested me for the second time. Fright and its ultimate manifestation, horror, come over you from the outside, while fear lurk inside you from the very beginning. Like courage, it is part of human nature. Between fear and courage there are two other natural human properties – reason and passion. They are factors in deciding between courage and fear. In that tiny fraction of a second which precedes the moment of decision one enjoys absolute freedom. One is free not at the moment of action because as he takes this action he turns on the current which re-energizes his nature. This "current" goes off only in the imperceptible instant between thought and action. We are free only at individual moments...

I should like to describe just one moment of freedom... Far be it for me to assert that, man's grandeur materializes only at such moments. I can imagine a life which is never blessed with freedom but which, nevertheless, retains its full value. The value of man consists in the fact that he perceives courage and fear, reason and passion not as antagonistic opposites to be destroyed, but as two poles of one field of tension - the field which is himself. For can there exist an irreconcilable feud between properties which are so much part of human nature that should one amputate any of them, the very soul will die? Look at all the zombies who, no matter how healthy their flesh may look, have died owing to the atrophy of fear or courage, reason or passion? Freedom is just an opportunity, and if one succeeds in using it, one may consider himself lucky; the most important thing, however, is to keep one's capacity for freedom...

In this war, most German soldiers moved not like somnambulas or drunks, but as if they were hypnotized; those under the spell of the evil eye can no longer discern the hypnotizer's iris and pupil. His consciousness is switched off, he is spellbound. They should have calmly admitted the fact – there is nothing disgraceful about that – and to denounce the excuse they invented in their last attempt to justify themselves – that they were under the oath of allegiance. Admittedly the oath of allegiance was a kind of a problem for many officers. As for private soldiers, I didn't meet a single one in the units I served with throughout the war who would drop as much as a word about the oath of allegiance. Not that it was taken as something too sacred to "take its name in vain" – the reason lay elsewhere.

Myself, I took the oath on a sunny morning in 1940 in our Rastatt barracks drill-ground. Standing in the second row of the lined-up rookie company, with my right hand stretched out at right angles, I repeated in unison with the others, paragraph by paragraph, the following text: "I am solemnly swear by God my unfailing allegiance to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, and my readiness to lay down my life under this oath."

I uttered these words without batting an eyelid while chuckling to myself over the primitive attempt by Hitler, that sewer rat, to attach me to himself. The absurdity of this oath stands out like a sore thumb.

In the reign of the sewer rat, failure to report to a draftee station spelt death or, at the very least, years of confinement to a concentration camp. The same fate awaited those who, sucked into the army along with millions of others, refused to take the oath at the eleventh hour.

Consequently, the oath was taken under coercion. Refusal to take it amounted to suicide. Therefore, it was worthless. A non-believer merely articulates the words of the oath, which leave him totally cold. A believer knows that the oath commits him to God, that it has a divine meaning. Vows made, and evidence given under oath are always voluntary. (One can be relieved of an oath if the latter turns out to be deliberately or unwittingly false). An oath manifests more strongly than anything else the dialectical interrelationship between restraint and freedom. If an oath is to mean anything at all, the person who takes it should be free. The oath is a religious act; otherwise, it makes no sense.

**Today, conscription and the oath of allegience are anachronisms which amount to a violation of basic human rights**

Most German soldiers did not believé in God or were indifferent to religion in the sense that except when lonely or at death's door they never gave God a thought. For that reason most German soldiers had no moral right to take the oath. The Fuehrer himself had no such moral right, either, because he denied God and suppressed any manifestations of religiosity: he knew that religion, if unopposed, would cut him down to size. He replaced the Almighty who has power over all (himself included) by a notion as awe-inspiring as it is empty – Providence.

It was only a believer who had the moral right to take the oath because it had meaning to him. Would there be such believer at all. If there were, all of them were stricken with blindness. They committed a mortal sin.

Because they had to tell themselves, if they retained at least a shred of intelligence, that God could not be interested in people obeying a sewer rat, and implicitly so. If they could not grasp this with their minds, they should have sensed that Lucifer's rat, snarling at God profanes the holiness of the oath by insisting that allegiance be sworn to it.

Believers and non-believers alike, all of them were stupefied.

Their fathers and grandfathers, the men of all the previous generations, had taken the soldier's oath of allegiance. As they did so, they were absorbed by a mighty ancient taboo, and failed to see the absolute emptiness inside the bell-glass of holiness born of words and incantations. From a certain moment in history, the space inside the bell-glass of the oath became empty.

That moment was the French Revolution. Conservatives all over the world are trying to prove, with a jeer, that the principle of universal conscription goes back to one of the most revolutionary events in world history. This is true, but the whole truth is that they have merely "borrowed" this principle from the Great Revolution rather than the basic principles of freedom, equality, brotherhood and human rights.

Be that as it may, modern states began, since the early 19th century, to conscript all their young men into the army. Coercion had been practiced before, within certain limits. The principle of voluntariness remained, however, although the notion of "soldier" gradually changed from the Land-

sknecht to the Guardsman of Friedrich the Great. Landsknechts took the oath of their own free will, while conscripted soldiers could not be relied upon.

Universal conscription left one no other option. Nevertheless, those recruited by force were made to take the oath of old, once sworn by mercenary landsknechts and guardsmen. That still made some semblance of sense as long as most people believed in God and as the head of the state, the ruler, regarded himself as God – anointed, as long as the idea of the Motherland remained universal, and as the law remained basically autonomous.

However, universal ideas evaporated, most people did not believe in God any longer, and a vast minority even started to reject the idea of the Motherland. There remained only power which as such took on a mythological lustre for some people, while others grew aware of the obviously imperialistic character of the epoch.

In the course of this process, universal conscription became a prerogative of power. It lost whatever meaning it had, even though for only a brief historical moment. Born of idealism in its prime, conscription exposed idealism as an illusion a century later. Every roar given out by a sergeant-major amounted to another 18-Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte (The author means Louis-Napoleon, Napoleon III. – **Ed.**).

**A chance cannot change anything about man's eternal urge to change his fate, especially at the moment of choice between death and non-freedom**

The once voluntary religious act of taking the oath, of free fighters swearing allegiance to their leader, degenerated into shamanism, into a ridiculous ritual for those bound hand and foot, into incantations uttered in the emptiness of barracks drill-grounds and not even bouncing off the walls of extinct faith.

This explains why, all through the war, I never heard any of the private soldiers around me say as much as a word about the oath. The absurdity of the war led by the sewer rat vaguely suggested to everyone the absurdity of conscription and of the soldier's oath. In the imperialist and, at the same time, ideological war unleashed by Hitler, conscription and the oath were already regarded not as a duty and obligation, but as unreserved compulsion. An epoch was nearing its end.

It turned out that serving in the army and taking the oath under compulsion were a violation of basic human rights, even in cases when a modern system of government is humane enough to allow some people to go by their own conscience which forbids them to serve in the army, be it even a "defensive" one. A free man alone can decide whether to go. A person should be free to decide whether to go into life-and-death combat. And it is only a believer that should take the oath of allegiance – to another believer.

The army of the future is bound to be an all-voluntary army. The status of religion today is such that taking an oath of allegiance in such an army would be senseless. Such a voluntary army will be a huge one if meant to repel brazen aggression.

Early in the war, it will be joined by many new volunteers and given support by countless partisans stirred into action by the atrocities of an enemy blinded by the lustre of power.

Even if it loses many battles, and even if it does not prevail, the society which produces such an army will lay the groundwork for the future. What's more, even in defeat its superior spirit will turn the winner into a loser devoid of historical meaning. As regards the regular army of the old type, a person may insist on the exercise of his basic rights, if he so wishes. In the face of the extreme coercion of universal conscription and of the compulsory oath, one can use only the extreme form of self-defence – desertion.

I wish I had understood all this on that day when I stood next to my discarded bicycle on a highway in the middle of Italy looking around me like a cornered beast. But then it might have been bad for me to know too much at the moment of action, to continue weighing all the pros and cons; ignorance may give odds to the one who acts. As I was looking around and taking in the landscape, I thought, with an elated sense of triumph, only about freedom I had given myself...

From the instant of freedom – I repeat: in our life, freedom can never last for more than a few seconds, but it is for their sake that we live at all – and from it alone do we draw the fortitude of spirit which rebels against fate and helps us to turn over a new leaf...

... And so I took flight through wilderness and desolation. I climbed down to a river valley and found myself amidst cracked-up cliffs and wooded hills. On my map the place was designated as Campagna diserta. I recalled that "diserta" derived from the same Latin root as the word "desert"; therefore, it was the right place for deserters, i.e. people who banish themselves to the desert.

Mine was a beautiful desert. I was treading upon carpets of yellow and lilac flowers. The scent of lavender and thyme was wafted to me by the breeze which also carried with it, over the hills, magnificent gold-and-black butterflies diving now and then to kiss light-blue rosemary flowers and large yellow moth-like mastic-tree blooms. An Italian pine cast its light shadow on a thyme-grown tract of wasteland basking in the golden sun. The playful breeze was whispering in the luxuriant verdure all around. As I walked on, I caught a glimpse, once again, of the valley bottom with its cliffs and lime-white, dried-up river bed edged with silent and perfectly still silvery-green shrubs... A tract of wilderness, which lay, like any desert, at the end of the world, at the end of life where our star hung over the enormous empty Nothingness.

By evening, I reached the edge of a vast wheatfield gently sloping towards the valley. Beyond the trees at the other edge of the valley I saw homes; there came the distant noise of tanks rolling past, somewhat sharper and more even than the din of the German tanks my ear was accustomed to. I heard the clang of tank tracks coming from afar... And then I did something incredibly pathetic – but I did it. I swung my carbine and threw it into the high waves of wheat...

In a hollow on the opposite slope I found a wild cherry tree, its branches sagging under the weight of shining, light-red, ripe berries. The grass around the tree was tender and looked intensely green in the gathering dusk. I pulled a branch down and started gathering the cherries. The hollow was like a room, and the rumble of the tanks was less audible there. Let them wait, I thought. I have time. While I was eating the cherries, time belonged to me. I baptized my cherries "ciliege diserte", deserted cherries, the wild desert cherries of my freedom. I ate several handfuls of them. They tasted fresh and tart.

# Licence to kill a writer

## An ayatollah's verdict and what came of it

It was like freely distributing licences during hunting season when a tame bear goes mad and runs away from the city zoo. Not only hunters get excited. Prompted by the ancient instinct of self-protection, people take up arms to find the beast and kill it.

Two years ago a licence to kill a writer was issued by ayatollah Khomeini. The writer was lucky. He and his family were taken under the protection of the government security service with a good reputation. Privately-hired bodyguards will not help this time. The whole city can hunt after a bear. Several hundred million people have been set on the writer.

Ayatollah Khomeini, who sentenced British writer Salman Rushdie to death for his *Satanic Verses*, explained to every Muslim that he will please Allah by killing the impious writer.

This logic bewilders of Europeans but seems quite natural to those who keenly listened to the revelations of the old man from Qum. Khomeini expressed his views about the godless and impious on several occasions.

*If someone allows the godless to play the part of profligates on earth, their ultimate moral punishment will be even stronger, he said. If we kill the godless to put an end to their corruptive actions we shall do them a service in the long run, because their final punishment will be less serious. Allowing the godless to remain alive means allowing them to commit more sins. Killing them means performing a surgical operation and fulfilling the will of the Allah the creator... Those who follow the rules of the Koran know that we must obey the laws of retribution and kill the godless.*

Salman Rushdie, who appealed to the British police for aid, failed to appreciate the humane and noble intentions of Khomeini, who decided to do him a gracious service, namely, to terminate his sinful life. The writer paid no heed to the advice of the ayatollah's disciples to pluck up his courage and prepare himself for death. Instead, he preferred to hide behind the broad backs of British bobbies and make excuses to the Muslim world.

Hunters were unable to track their victim down. They burned lots of copies of Rushdie's book and killed 18 persons whose views of modern literature differed from theirs. The writer could not bear the confrontation with the Muslim world and adopted Islam. He now wants to be a true Muslim as his parents were.

Today Salman Rushdie is criticized by others. He should not have yielded to pressure, they say. One must not give way to fanatics who, seeing the weakness of their victims, become even more cruel.

It is pleasant to read stories about cool-headed and unbending heroes who would rather die than renounce their views. The feats of other people are a kind of moral statement. If someone proves below a certain standard, public opinion immediately topples him from his pedestal. No excuses are made if he renounced his views to save his life. Let him die a martyr. He does not have any right to deprive us of the possibility to admire his feat.

Rushdie's colleagues are disappointed in him. The demand for heroes obviously exceeds the need for good writers, and Rushdie has not ceased to be such. Stormy disappointment in Rushdie seems to be a manifestation of bloodthristiness, as if people would feel easier if the pious disciples of the late ayatollah finally tracked down the writer.

Salman Rushdie decided to take care of himself and his family. It is a matter of personal choice and conscience. Of course, moral relativism does not arouse sympathies, but another thing is more important: Rushdie is not the first and, apparently, not the last writer whose books were burnt. Can literature be saved from present-day fire-worshippers?

*There must be no violence in religion, the Koran says. You should be condesceding to others and do good. People, your violence will cause harm only to you... If you hear that someone expresses opinions contrary to what our scripture says, turn away from him until he begins to talk about other things. But if the Satan compels you to forget about this, don't sit with the unrighteous. A man who errs cannot do harm to you if you are on the right path.*

What is in common between these behests from the Koran and Khomeini's call to kill the unrighteous? Does the Allah contradict himself? Or do people attribute their words to him? Seeing the burning of Rushdie's books and hearing hysterical cries of the mob beneath the portraits of Khomeini or Saddam Hussein, hardly anyone will remember that it was Arabs, Muslim believers open to the entire world, who have brought tolerance to Europeans. Why have these believers started granting licences to kill peaceful writers?

*Drawing from Die Zeit (Germany)*

*Leonid Mlechin*

Just before the referendum on the future of the Union, **Marat Chormanov,** co-Chairman of the Kazakh civil movement "Azat" published a program statement of their organization in the independent socio-political newspaper of the republic *Birlesu*. In it he says that the main goal of "Azat" is to see Kazakhstan "a sovereign state within the framework of a community of free and independent states, united by an international union treaty." Chormanov names the European community as an example for the future union. He believes that the republics must become a "subject of international law with all the natural consequences."

Although the other republics know little about Kazakh "non-formals", they do exist and have founded about a dozen parties and movements: from the "Zheltoksan" national-democratic party to the "Green" movement. Most advanced of them is the democratic movement – the social-democratic party of Kazakhstan, "The Party of Justice", the international movement "Unity", and the "Azat" civil movement. Marat Chormanov says that at present all these groups are trying to work out a common ground.

As for the attitude of the "non-formal" groups to the authorities, Chormanov describes it as follows:

"Some are singing praise to Nursultan Nazarbayev, though this strong politician does not need it. What he does need is support and practical assistance of his allies, – intelligent and energetic people."

* * *

Soviet magicians, witch-doctors, wizards and sleephealers gathered in Tallinn and in connection with the law on public organizations founded an association of white and black Magic.

The organization is headed by magician **Albert Stepanyan.**

The president claims that the name "magician" was bestowed on him by the people. Therefore he can be regarded as a "people's magician."

Albert says that he is a kind magician, because so far he has done no harm to anyone. It's hard to tell if one can rely on the kindness and mercy of "black" magicians who worship the devil, but the association led by Stepanyan has started its activity with charity and healing the sick. Healing seances have been held at the diabetics' society in Tallinn. As a result, Stepanyan says that in 72 out of 200 cases the level of sugar in the patients' blood was reduced to normal. The magacians also visited a labor camp in order to "open the souls of the inmates". They plan to visit Narva, Tartu, and Kokhtla-Jarve.

The association groups mostly people with a medical education. But as for Stepanyan, he says he received knowledge and power from cosmos. The scope of the diseases he can cure is very wide. In several cases he didn't see the patient, but rather his photograph. He also claims that his own photographs have healing powers if he was photographed "in a special state." The *NT* hopes it won't side with *Soviet Russia* or ape *Vechernyaya Moskva* if it says that the snapshot printed above possesses some healing powers.

Stepanyan will shortly publish a book *The secrets of magic and old prescriptions*. Following the association, a "school of magicians" and a "School of witch-doctors" will open.

* * *

The Siberian Information Agency (SibIA) made itself known last year when it carried information about a strike in Kuzbass, which differed greatly from the official information. Since then SibIA has prestige as one of the most interesting regional agencies. Among its founders is 34-year-old **Alexei Manannikov,** who is also editor of the publications of the "Vienna-89" Siberian human rights association.

Alexei, who had a higher economic education, taught in a college, and studied at post-

## Defending Fucik's behests

Prior to his present job, that of a cleaner of passenger cars at the Prague railway-station, **Jan Jelinek** worked for 13 years for the Czechoslovak communist newspaper *Rude Pravo*. When the 44-year-old journalist criticized the changed character of the newspaper which had ceased being a Communist Party body, Jan was left without work. But he is not ashamed of his present occupation, after all, he believes, that someone has to wash trains too. Apart from that he engages in social work.

– We have to repell the worsening attacks of extremists, who are willing to cross out even positive moments in the party's history, and are trying to forget many achievements of Czecho-Slovakia in the field of social guarantees of workers in the period of socialist development and mar our international traditions, – Jelinek says.

He is especially upset by the "groundless accusations" against the heroes of the anti-fascist Resistance movement. The name of writer Julius Fucik is being offended too.

– The dead cannot defend themselves, – Jelinek says. – But we communists cannot remain silent when the present-day democratic activists are trying to dub Fucik a traitor and Gestapo informant.

At the beginning of 1990 *Rude Pravo* carried an article in defence of Julius Fucik by an initiative group of journalists, which included Jelinek. And in October an evening of reminiscences about Fucik was held at the Center of Soviet science and culture. The event was devoted to the 45th anniversary of the first edition of the famous *Notes from the Gallows*. The journalists also prepared a film *The last battle of Fucik*.

Jan Jelinek has been made the Chairman of the "Fucik's behests" club. The new organization sees its tasks in "defending and popularizing the revolutionary heritage of all the patriots and progressive figures of Czechoslovak and international history."

As he was telling about the defiling of historical sites in Prague, connected with the work of Julius Fucik and the outrage upon his monument, which had until recently stood in a special niche in the writer's house, Jelinek said that after a long search he had found the bust at a storage of the services industry. At present, members of the club are gathering signatures under a petition urging the municipal authorities to restore the bust and replace it. What worries Jelinek is that during a short period of time an act of vandalism against the monument to Communist journalist Jozka Jaburkova was carried out in the same district (it was poured over with paint), but the municipal authorities did not censure this hooligan act.

**I. Shamshin,**
Prague

graduate courses. His research career was interrupted by prison, where he spent three years for "spreading slander" about our state, under the former article 190 of the Criminal code of the Russian Federation. In fact, he had been corresponding with somebody and wrote something critical about the Soviet socialist system. After his prison term he couldn't find a job and then worked as an unskilled worker.

Manannikov, "Vienna-89" and SibIA are advertizing the idea of Siberia's autonomy, the restoration of cultural centres and "regional consciousness".

Alexei's relations with local authorities are still tense. Last spring "non-formals" in Novosibirsk were dispersed by special militia units; and in the summer of 1989 the entire edition of the "Vienna–89" press-bulletin was arrested. But Manannikov says that "the authorities had to drop charges against him and return the edition. Since then the shadowing has stopped".

Recently SibIA decided to cover the case of Scholenberg; an activist of the "Rebirth" society of Soviet Germans. Scholenberg was arrested last autumn by the security bodies on charges of illegal dealings with foreign companies. The *NT* wrote about him in its 44/90 issue.

* * *

The head of the council of observers of the "Deutsche Bank" 69-year-old **Dr. Friedrich Wielhelm Kristians** is described as an "architect" of East-West trade and a European Rockefeller. He is considered one of the most authoritative German financiers and an expert on the Soviet Union and Russian avant-garde. In the late 60s he expressed a thought that Europe could not remain split forever, and stressed the need for developing close cooperation between Federal Germany and the USSR.

Dr. Kristians took part in the preparation and implementation of the "deal

of the century" – the building of the Siberia – Western Europe gas pipeline. Kristians described his work with Soviet entrepreneurs, ministers and party leaders in his book *The Roads to Russia*.

For the first time Kristians found himself in Russia on June 22, 1941. That day the graduate of the Potsdam military school received an order to take his unit to Baku, where they had to guarantee the security of the oil-wells. He was wounded several times and was nearly killed by a Russian marksman. He ended war at the walls of Königsberg. After the war he visited that city and suggested setting up an industrial and technological center for Soviet-German joint ventures and a higher scientific, technical and ecological school and turning the Kaliningrad region into a zone of Soviet-German trade. Dr. Kristians knows about the plans to set up a Kant Fund and suggests June 22, 1991 as the day of its foundation. He believes that Russians and Germans must be fully reconciled with each other some day.

Four-year-old American girl **Narelle Jordan** has caused a lot of trouble and pain to her parents. They nearly got into prison on her account.

Like all other children Norelle was learning to walk and naturally fell down, but very often these incidents ended badly – the girl would be taken to hospital with broken limbs. By the age of three she had broken her limbs nine times. Doctors at the children's clinic where Narelle was taken, got worried: a normal healthy child cannot fall down so often and get so badly hurt. People at the social service, which exists at every American hospital, decided that the girls' parents were taunting their daugher, and turned to legal bodies.

The unfortunate parents had to turn to specialists-orthopedists. After a more scrupulous examination they found out that the girl had osteogenesis imperfecta, type I, a rare genetic disorder affecting the body's ability to form collagen, which strengthens the bones. About one child in every 30,000 has O.I. The doctors believe that with age the girl's condition will normalize.

After all they have gone through, the Jordan family are urging physicians to carry out a scrupulous medical examination before bringing an action against the parents, suspected of cruel treatment of their children.

## The bad student of a military instructor

"I will slam the torn door leading into the world where we were wandering, I guess it is spring if there are birds and clouds in the sky... And those who stand upright can see beyond the wall. Today my dreams will come true", wrote a year ago **Andrei Gubin,** a fifteen-year-old Moscow school student. These are lines from his song "Ave Maria" which won first prize at a festival of songs for children and the youth in Kishinev. For its performance Andrei was awarded the Grand-Prix. And now he's a freshman at the Gnesin music school. He studies at the vocal department.

When still in school he wrote the following lines: "Our militarized school opens our eyes to the world: Behind the iron curtain – the horrible image of the enemy: So don't think twice, click the bolt of your gun, if your life is dear to you. And our life-long dream is to see our military instructor as the Head of the Soviet State."

He began writing songs three years ago. "Not about politics and not for fame. It was just in the air. True, I always hated our school subject called "military training" – and that was the only "bad" mark I had upon finishing school. – says Andrei. – Our school was located in Medvedkovo, a district in Moscow. The school building was surrounded by the houses of servicemen, and I studied together with their children. When I wrote this song I sang it to them, and they laughed. The children of servicemen were laughing at their parents.

In his songs Andrei describes what he sees around him. And he performs his own songs. It may seem that his songs are influenced by Boris Grebenshikov or "Nautilus Pompilius", but there are many thoughts of his own.

He performed in Luzhniki and at the Olympic stadium. "Our faith, dreams and freedom were stolen, and gods are feasting in the midst of plague. They've long since forgotten how to cry, and we forgot how to laught." This is one of his latest songs. Andrei says that there's no protest in it; he finished the song on a different note: "The boy born in the garden of love is looking to us with hope."

"I cannot sing songs of protest now, I want to sing about love and hope. You know, there's something in the air..."

# The Russian Salon revived

**Non-official art has already been "rehabilitated" in our country. Now it is about time we revived the status of official art catering to the tastes and requirements of the national elite...**

*Yelena Pivovarova*

The preponderance of ideology was equally pernicious for avant-garde non-conformist art and for its antipode which I am at a loss for words to describe – is it elite, conservative, salon art? The restoration of this trend is beginning today as part of a more general restoration of our economy and our spiritual life.

The restoration of the Russian Salon begins with retrieving from oblivion the traditions of our national school of painting as it was before the avant-garde revolution which exploded spiritual life in the same way the October Revolution exploded society. There was a difference, though: the October Revolution affected Russia, while the avant-garde revolution in art affected chiefly the West.

By now, our people have had enough of the revolution in art, just as they have of that in the social sphere. This is why the avant-garde trends which have emerged from the underground so triumphantly following the onset of perestroika now do not stand much of a chance to dominate our art scene.

It is common knowledge that the Western Establishment backed avant-garde art and created a rich market for it. The West, however, has had no social revolution. The question is whether our own Establishment is going to faithfully reproduce the Western avant-garde market situation here on the "keep up with the Joneses" principle.

It looks as if we have no spiritual prerequisites for that. The nation is exhausted by the Great Experiment. Avant-gardism in art is associated too literally with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Western historians of avant-garde art believe that Russia has had a very special role to play in the history of 20th-century Western art. This explains why Russian classical art and Soviet underground avant-garde are such a great success in the Western art market.

***Orchid.*** **By Tamara Glytneva, an artist practically unknown in this country. The only exhibition arranged in her lifetime was in Malta's Embassy in Moscow, 1985. Glytneva's works are on display in the 20th Century Museum, Vienna**

The situation in the domestic art market, now in its formative stages, is likely to be different, although this market naturally begins with attempts at mechanically reproducing on our soil the situation in the Western modern art market.

In order to stem this trend, suffice it to ponder over the key figure of the art market – the buyer. This figure demands full rehabilitation. Without the Soviet buyer there can be no Soviet market.

The domestic art market has already found its first buyers. In Moscow, they are leading commercial banks: the Moscow Joint-Stock Innovation Bank and the Menatep Financial Group which have revived the tradition of investing in works of our national art. For the first time in Soviet history, private investments have been made in art in accordance with the laws of the free market. Similar investments have already been made in Leningrad and Kiev.

The Soviet industrial and banking elite constitute the new Establishment which is to bring not only new prices but new tastes to the revived art market. The first thing which is now expected to happen – and which is actually happening already – is commercial art's dissociation from the "Soviet" brand of art which is intended for "all" but which no one really cares for. Although cultivated by the Artists' Union for decades, this art has never found a market.

The emergence of the bona fide buyer has brought art back into the expensive, luxury category. This is one of the main reasons why the all

**Aleksandr Grebnev is building up a collection of Russian art for the Moscow Joint-Stock Innovation Bank of which he is board chairman. For all we can tell he is one of our future Tretyakov Brothers**

but forgotten word, the Salon, is back in our active vocabulary.

Art is now to regain its former eye appeal. Art ought to cater to the tastes of those who buy it. For the first time perhaps since the Revolution in Russia, the buyer is becoming the ultimate arbiter of good taste. This is what the revival of the Salon is really all about.

The new revived Russian Salon is to restore first and then to carry on the traditions of the national Russian school of painting all the way to avant-garde. The revival of the Salon trend in art is to show direct dependence of a picture's market success on the extent to which it gratifies the buyer's taste. Tastes differ not only from person to person, but from nation to nation as well. As far as our country and the changes taking place in it are concerned, the artistic taste of the new entrepreneurial class, which is responsible for our economic rise, cannot but be connected with the overall spiritual renaissance of the nation.

This is why the comeback of the Salon amounts to more than just another shift of fashion in our art. The Salon will bring back to life a whole sphere of art which, until now, has been denied the right to exist as a forbidden luxury. Along with the Salon, we shall retrieve the notion of beauty inherent in "pure art" remote from social problems.

I expect the Salon, with its banal truths, to come under critical fire as has been the case many times before. Indeed, the new Salon will hardly think up anything new. But then, neither will its critics. All this is nothing new. Simply it's about time to get back to the eternal truths of life.

Possibly, the new Russian Salon of the late 20th century is to carry out a counterrevolution in art, to restore a normal picture of the world, although the history of 20th-century Western art seems to indicate that this is impossible. Now that the natural and free development of avant-garde in the West has obviously come up against a blind alley, spiritual prerequisites for a return to traditional art are being created in Russia.

The most unexpected peripetia in our art scene is that the Salon will not look anachronistic today. This is not an archaeological excavation of 19th-century Russian art but its true rebirth.

The ways which have led to this rebirth are inscrutable. Be that as it may, there already are artists of different generation whose art shows features of the modern Russian Salon. They are betrayed, above all, by the downright beauty of their pictures which is taken as "kitsch" from the standpoint of modern aesthetics. Sophisticated brushwork – again, quite superfluous in modern art – is developed unhurriedly, as a rule, over the years if not decades.

All this imparts an old-fashioned and somewhat exotic look to modern Salon art. Nevertheless, it is brushwork that largely determines the market value of this art – a businessman prefers good craftsmanship.

The 20th century has got people accustomed to the idea – even in this country where avant-garde has never taken root – that in art ideas take precedence over craftsmanship. This is, perhaps, one of the most ingrained prejudices to be shaken by the new Salon in the near future.

The apparent absence of formal experiments, on one side, and of concepts, on the other, does not mean, however, that the Salon is conceptually neutral. In rehabilitating the Salon we keep emphasizing the fact that it caters to the tastes of a perfectly definite category of people and settles for that. Notably, this category is supposed to play – and does – the leading role in society.

The Salon addresses itself to pragmatic business people who can afford the luxury of loving this mundane world. Therefore, works of art having nihilistic or destructive overtones are unacceptable to the Salon. The Salon is open only to the art of positive values and earthly joys. Both commodities are in short supply here.

In 20th-century art the exhibition as such has acquired a tremendous self-sufficing importance. There has even appeared a special genre called installation. By definition, the Salon art has more to do with everyday life. It is intended not for public exhibitions, but for collectors, for buyers. In this sense the new wave in Russian art should not become a popular craze. It will hardly sweep over the galleries which, historically, are more identified with experimental art trends. The new wave's influence and significance will depend, contrariwise, on the rarity of this art, the amont of effort put into it and its exclusiveness owning to its high market prices and high provessional standards put into it.

Salon art is destined to be a favourite of the corporative collection movement and to become part of the first corporative national collections on a par with last-century Russian classics. The traditions will be restored.

**The Manezh corporative gallery of Moscow commercial banks is building up the first corporative collection of modern Russian Salon art under the motto "The Russian Salon Revival." This collection will be offered for sale to Soviet banks and corporations in September 1991 at the gallery premises:**
**1, Manezhnaya Sq., Moscow**
**Telephone: 202–82–52**

# He reminds one of Fisher

Vassily Ivanchuk arrived at the chess tournament at about nine in the evening of January 20. He checked into the Riga's fashionable Ridzene Hotel, deposited his bags in his room and then headed downstairs to dine with his coach, Master of Sports Felix Levin. They entered the dining hall where the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, Anatoly Gorbunov, a Polish marshal and many foreign diplomats and journalists were seated.

Just after nine o'clock riot police entered the hotel and opened fire through the walls and windows. It was that same tragic evening that the Rigan riot police stormed the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. The lights went out in the restaurant. The Polish marshal's body-guard fired a warning shot. The "Black Berets" decided not to risk trying to seize the banquet hall and the diners managed to evacuate to the kitchen. In the meantime, the riot police forced their way into a neighbouring building, set a machine gun and open fire on the building standing opposite – the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Latvia.

After this incident, Ivanchuk and his team were ready to leave Riga to play the match against Leonid Yudasin somewhere else. But the next morning Vassily decided he would stay.

Grand Master Yudasin, who arrived in Riga on the morning of the 21st was not easily frightened, and his trainer, Master Alexander Cherepkov, was far from a cowardly figure himself. He fought in the war on four fronts, was wounded twice and received many battle decorations and medals.

In a word, the match was destined to go forth. The final results were similar to those Fisher often racked up – 4.5:0.5 in favor of Ivanchuk (the best of 8 games). What was the secret of Ivanchuk's victory?

Felix Levin comments: "Ivanchuk has natural gifts. In his play and analyses he is often completely unpredictable. He masterfully picks though his options and acts with extreme confidence in difficult situations. Often he doesn't even look at the board – the pieces simply distract him. In his childhood Vassily amazed others by his ability to solve chess problems without looking at a board. In addition, he has an incredible capacity for work. During the match we devoted virtually all our free time to preparing for the next game. Other players might have given in under the strain, but Ivanchuk is used to the intense nature of the preparation. And another thing: Ivanchuk never allows an opponent's mistake to go unpunished."



**The student from Lvov, Vassily Ivanchuk, could rival Garri Kasparov and Anatoly Karpov for the world chess title. Recently the 22-year-old Grand Master scored a crushing victory in Linares against both Kasparov and Karpov! His rating of 2735 is second only to that of the current world champion (2800). Perhaps they will meet in a match in 1993. But before this, Ivanchuk will have to make it through the selection rounds. His first match against 31-year-old Leningrad resident Leonid Yudasin was held in Riga this January...**

Here is what Ivanchuk's former trainer, Master Mikhail Nekrasov, has to say about him: "Vassily eats, sleeps and drinks chess 15–20 hours a day. He is constantly moving about chess figures in his mind and conducting various analyses. For him, chess is a drug he can't live without. His psychological make-up and perception of the world are extremely unusual. Occasionally Vassily becomes so engrossed in himself that he doesn't even notice people standing next to him. He is amazingly talented, even brilliant at chess but besides chess there is little else that interests him."

But do the trainers of this young Grand Master see in him any deficiencies? "There are some," admits Felix Levin. "Sometimes he plays in a weak-willed manner. In general, in order to beat him, one has to come up with something he's never seen before. That is, one has to surprise him (and that is devilishly difficult to do) as well as break him psychologically. Ivanchuk's style reminds one of Fisher's (he was born, like Fisher on March 18 – the Pisces). He too plays with intensified energy in order to achieve a win and takes any loss too emotionally. I doubt, however, that even Fisher achieved as much in his analyzes as Vassily..."

"You exaggerate!" protests Ivanchuk. "How can we know how Fisher played and analyzed things? Felix flatters me."

Whether this is exaggeration or not, only time will tell. In August Vassily Ivanchuk will go up against Artur Yusupov of in the quarterfinal match. His opponent, who is just over 30, was also party to an unfortunate incident last year: he was shot at by burglars.

The three other quarterfinal contests will be fought between: ex-world champion Anatoly Karpov, 40, against a talented native of India Viswanathan Anand, 21; Minsk-native Boris Gelfand, 23, against Nigel Short of England, 26; Jan Timman of Holland, 40, against the unsinkable Viktor Korchnoi (Switzerland), who on March 23 celebrated his 60th birthday.

They will compete in Brussels where, one assumes, they will avoid being shot at.

*Vladimir Fedorov,*
*Dmitry Plisetsky*
*Photo by Boris Dolmatovsky*
*(from the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR)*

# THIS PAGE IS READ BY AN ENTIRE WORLD

NEW TIMES

Your advertisement in *New Times* is read in one-hundred countries in six languages.
Phone us at 209-92-82 or 209-11-71 or write us at: 103782, GSP, Moscow K-6, Pushkin Square.
Expert artists and photographers are at your service!

АЭРОФЛОТ
Soviet airlines

# Cargo by air!

*Aeroflot carries cargo to and from over 100 countries on regular and chartered flights. Aeroflot guarantees rapid and safe passage of your cargo.*

*Payment accepted in cash, by check or letter of guarantee. Aeroflot widely uses preferential tariffs for whole categories and separate types of cargo.*

*For information contact an Aeroflot representative abroad or the Central International Agency directly at 125212, Moscow, Leningradskoye shosse, 29 Phone: 156-80-19 Telex: 411922 Telefax: 150567*

АЭРОФЛОТ
Soviet airlines

**Aeroflot is at your service!**

ИНДЕКС 70622 НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫ